When Conceptual Metaphors Govern Linguistic Expressions: A Textual Analysis

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From the perspective of conceptual metaphor theory, this paper analyzes a Chinese essay titled "On 'Heart' for the New Year." It examines the conceptions of "heart" constituting in part the Chinese cultural models for morality. While the sample essay tries to expound and promote a valuable moral heritage from ancient Chinese thought, which is seen as lost in modern and contemporary China, it argues for the restoration of this moral heritage from traditional Chinese culture. What is of special interest is the fact that this ethical heritage from ancient Chinese thought and traditional Chinese culture, which is abstract in nature, is understood in terms of *xin* "heart." This is when cognitive mechanisms such as metaphor and metonymy play a crucial role in the conceptualization of higher mental functions in terms of lower bodily experiences. It is argued that the scaffold of metaphoric and metonymic mappings and their entailments provides the essay under discussion with its coherence when they are manifested at the surface level by linguistic expressions, which provide the text with its cohesion. This essay is a good example of how underlying conceptual metaphors and metonymies help create coherence of a text through their conceptual governance of surface linguistic expressions.

As Holland and Quinn (1987) suggest and show, cultural knowledge organized in cultural models can be propositional, metaphorical, and metonymic, enabling the performance of different kinds of cognitive tasks (see Quinn, 1987; Quinn & Holland, 1987). In this paper, I discuss the propositions, metonymies, and metaphors that underlie the discourse of a text and how they play roles in the construction of the Chinese cultural model for morality. The prosaic text to be analyzed is an essay on the supreme importance and significance of the concept of "heart" in Chinese thought and culture, written by a renowned contemporary scholar of Chinese philosophy and history, Ying-shih Yu. The essay was found in a newspaper that carried it as a reprint (Yu, 2005).

My selection of this sample text was actually quite random and accidental: In my leisure reading I came across it and spotted the key word *xin* "heart" in its title, so I saved it for my future study of the Chinese conceptualization of the heart, which is understood as the central faculty of cognition in traditional Chinese culture (see Yu, 2007a, 2007b, 2008). It was chosen as a sample text for my study mainly because it centers on the concept of "heart" so that I could look closely into a relatively small section of discourse and find out how the essayist actually perceives and conceives the notion of "heart" within his separate "conceptual universe" (Freeman, 2000, 2002). It turns out that a close textual analysis of this essay not only adds a discourse perspective to my comprehensive study of the Chinese cultural conceptualization of "heart" (Yu, 2009a), but also sheds light on how underlying conceptual metaphors and metonymies can govern linguistic expressions at surface so as to provide coherence and cohesion to a particular text. Although my sample text (the essay under discussion) is in Chinese, my analysis will be based on my English translation of it so that it

can be accessed and appreciated by a wider audience. The Chinese original, however, is provided in the appendix at the end of this paper. Since my study delves into the underlying conceptual level rather than focusing on the linguistic surface, in order to grasp the propositional, metonymic, and metaphoric concepts that stay at an abstract plane, I hope that the use of the English translation, instead of its original Chinese, can be justified for my analysis and discussion.

Methodologically, the study in this chapter is inspired and informed by cognitive stylistics, or cognitive poetics, which is a field "at the interface between linguistics, literary studies and cognitive science" (Semino & Culpeper, 2002b, p. ix), or "an interdisciplinary approach to the study of literature employing the tools offered by cognitive science" (Tsur, 2008, p. 1). Focused on textual analysis of language and cognition, cognitive stylistics may be seen either as part of the cognitive linguistics paradigm or as being fed into by the cognitive theories or paradigms including cognitive linguistics (Semino & Culpeper, 2002a, 2002b). In contrast with formal linguistics that is interested only in a theoretical account of linguistic competence, cognitive linguistics adopts an encyclopedic view of language and attempts a scientific account of natural language in use, showing "increasing awareness of how literary texts might provide a productive source of data for investigation" (Freeman, 2006, p. 404). Freeman (2006) believes that cognitive poetics as part of cognitive linguistics serves as a bridge between literary studies and linguistics: "Whereas literary critics focus on illuminating the language of the text, cognitive linguists focus on illuminating the language of the embodied mind. This is where cognitive poetics comes in" (p. 404–405). According to cognitive poetics, metaphors are not just strategies for enlivening language, but also markers of writers' ways of thinking about the world, and signs of their conceptual universe (Freeman, 2000). Conceptual metaphors and metonymies, as defined by cognitive linguistics, play important roles in the construction of both meaning and form in literary and nonliterary discourse (e.g., Barcelona, 2005; Freeman, 2000, 2002, 2006; Gibbs, 1994; Gibbs & Wilson, 2002; Hamilton, 2002; Lakoff & Turner, 1989; Nerlich, 2005; Oakley, 1998; Panther, 2005; Popova, 2002; Semino, 2002; Steen, 2002, 2004, 2007).

Having laid out the rationale, goal, and methodological issues of my study in this paper, I now proceed to the analysis of the paper itself. In the next section, I will look into the essay on the supreme importance and significance of the concept of "heart" in Chinese thought and culture. Section 3 concludes with a summary and some discussion.

Analysis

The selected Chinese essay, titled "On 'Heart' for the New Year" (新年话"心"), is written by Ying-shih Yu (Yu, 2005), a distinguished historian, philosopher, and professor emeritus of Chinese studies at Princeton University. In 2006, Ying-shih Yu was "the co-winner of the third John W. Kluge Prize for lifetime achievement in the study of humanity," says News@Princeton (2006). According to the same online source, "The prize rewards accomplishment in the wide range of disciplines not covered by the Nobel prizes, including history, philosophy, politics, anthropology, sociology, religion, criticism in the arts and humanities, and linguistics" (News@Princeton, 2006).

The Text

Provided below is my own translation of the sample essay, with every fifth line numbered for convenient reference; the Chinese original can be found in the appendix. In the translation, the italic font face is added for emphasis. Although this very literal translation may appear somewhat unnatural in English, it enables the reader to perceive the metaphorical imagery and structure of the original Chinese.

On "Heart" for the New Year

The heart is the *most important thing to the Chinese*, and therefore you should *cultivate your heart*. The heart should be *cultivated* so that it is *clean*. Only if the heart is *clean* can a *pure* society emerge; if the heart has become *dirty* and gone *bad*, then the whole society will go *bad*. This is not idealism; this is to talk about the *importance* of the heart. Instead of being completely determined by material conditions and social identity, the *human spirits* exert a strong influence on material conditions as well. If you want everyone to lead a good life, then, as the Chinese saying goes, "Do not impose on others what you do not desire yourself." The reason why Confucius and Confucian classics said this is that people should *compare their own hearts with others' hearts*. "Other people have the heart, and we should *conjecture it*." If I think about *how others' heart would be* and *compare it with my own heart*, I would not do certain things. That is why the Chinese believe the heart is *extremely important*.

Why should Chinese culture talk emphatically about the heart? This is because, according to the Chinese, the heart is *equivalent to a kind of god*, which is very *changeable* and *all-inclusive*. Therefore, some philosophers, such as Lu Xiangshan and Wang Yangming, said: *My heart is the universe; the universe is my heart*. This is not idealism. Instead, it argues that if we want to build up a *human* society, in which everyone leads a happy life, we need to *expand our heart*, rather than employ a *selfish heart*. The selfish heart should have its *limit*. This limit is not to interfere with the *public heart*.

Zi Chan in the Spring and Autumn period said: *Human hearts differ with their unique faces*. That is, the Chinese also affirm the *individual heart*. However, there also exists a *big collective heart* operating at the same time. In this way, we will not be subject to the so-called absolute collectivism, nor will we be subject to absolute individualism. We should try to find a point of balance between the individual and the collective. *The function of finding this point of balance comes from the heart*. Zhang Zai in the eleventh-century Song dynasty wrote an essay titled "Enlarging the Heart," that is, one should try to *enlarge one's heart*. For instance, Zhuangzi in the Warring States period said: *The heaven and earth and ten thousand things are all one with me.* The Chinese often talk about *heaven and man being one*, and this also means that the *heart should be expanded*.

On the one hand, one should not *give up one's own unique heart*, and on the other hand, one should *enlarge one's heart so as to think of others*. Only in this way can we lead a *better*, and *more orderly*, life. This is because the Chinese do not very

much believe that there is an after-life heaven and especially they, influenced by Confucianism, believe that this world is a true and real one. We should treasure and value it. If we treasure and value it, our heaven lies in this world, so does our hell. This is one view of the Chinese.

Mencius wrote the essay titled *Cleaning the Heart*, which argues, as we all know, that if we know *our own nature*, we know the heaven. Zhuangzi said, the *heart should be empty*; only after the heart is *empty* can the *Dao "Way" enter into it*. As Mencius said, "Everyone has the *heart of compassion.*" In "Benevolence, Rightness, Propriety, Wisdom," *"Benevolence" refers to the heart that is most critical to humans*. Here, "Benevolence" means "*love people*," love other people; not only love yourself, but also love others. That is why, when Mencius talked about "heart," he would always talk about "*push*": people should *push their own heart*, and *the more they push it, the bigger it will become*, and *the further it will reach*, so that *it will include the whole society*. People like Hui Shi and Zhuang Zhou would *push it even further*; *their heart would become so big* that they would *love the heaven and earth and ten thousand things*.

This is the reason why *the Chinese people's heart is so important*. It has *become* the *heart* that *everyone possesses*. It is *a special tradition in Chinese thought*. Under this tradition in China, there is no organized religion, and there is no tradition of church as organized and centralized as in the West. Something akin to the supreme commanding by the Roman Pope during the Middle Ages has never happened in China. Among the Chinese, *everyone is a heart*, and *everyone's heart is connectable with the heaven*. But you have to *cultivate your heart. If you do not cultivate it, your heart will become smaller and smaller, and more and more selfish*. Then, the society will be in turmoil.

For this reason, I believe, *when we talk about the issue of values, the issue of spiritual values, in China, we must trace it to the heart*. It is almost *as important as the concept of God* in the West; it is *indispensable*. *Once it is lost, humans are not different from animals*. Therefore, in China, it has always been asserted that one should *cleanse one's heart*. In the past one hundred years in China, I think, *the heart has become a big problem* because we no longer believe in ancient Chinese thought, *having lost the Chinese heritage*, whereas we cannot believe in the Western God either. Thus, our *heart has lost its locus*. Everyone's *heart has almost been seduced by material profits*. … Under such circumstances, *the Heart of China has been lost*. The *loss of the Heart is one of the biggest keys to the crises of Chinese culture* in the past one hundred years.

I raise the issue of the heart to you all so that you can think it over. This is what I want to address for the New Year.

The Embodiment Thesis

As is quite obvious, the author of the essay is trying to expound and promote a valuable moral heritage from ancient Chinese thought, which he thinks has been lost in modern and contemporary China. He argues for the restoration of this moral heritage from traditional Chinese culture. What is of special interest is the fact that this ethical heritage from ancient

Chinese thought and traditional Chinese culture, which is abstract in nature, is understood in terms of *xin*, a term that originally denotes the heart organ, the most critical part of the body. According to the embodiment hypothesis, human cognition, including human language and thought, is embodied. That is, abstract values and concepts and subjective experiences and judgments are, at least partially, conceptualized, in one way or another, in terms of our body and grounded in our bodily experience in the physical and cultural world (see Gibbs, 1994, 2006; Gibbs & Wilson, 2002; Johnson, 1987, 2007; Lakoff, 1987a, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999). In the particular case of the essay under discussion, the moral values and ethical codes that guide Chinese people's thoughts and actions are conceptualized as originating in their heart and, for that matter, are talked about in terms of their heart. This is when cognitive mechanisms and structures, such as metaphor and metonymy, play a crucial role in the conceptualization of higher mental functions in terms of lower bodily experiences or, vice versa, in the projection of lower bodily experiences onto higher mental functions. As Rohrer (2006) points out, the embodiment hypothesis is especially associated with a particular strand of cognitive linguistics, i.e. the cognitive semantic approach to the study of metaphor and metonymy, known as conceptual metaphor theory, which can be traced back to its origin in Lakoff and Johnson's seminal book *Metaphors We Live By* (1980). Our mind is embodied in such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the peculiarities of our body and the specifics of our physical and cultural environment. Our body plays a crucial role in our meaning and understanding, and our embodiment in and with the physical and cultural world sets out the contours of what is meaningful to us and determines the ways of our understanding. It follows that human meaning and understanding are in part metaphorical, mapping from the concrete to the abstract. It also follows that our body, with its experiences and functions, is a potentially universal source domain for metaphorical mappings onto more abstract domains (Gibbs, 1994, 2006; Kövecses, 2005; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Yu, 1998, 2009b).

The Cultural Model: Propositions, Metonymies and Metaphors

In what follows, I analyze the Chinese cultural models for morality in terms of the "heart," which in turn is understood as the central faculty of cognition and the organ of moral judgment. The Chinese cultural model for morality consists of propositions (i.e. cultural beliefs), metonymies, and metaphors involving the "heart" and demonstrating how the "heart" is understood in Chinese culture. Here is a list of relevant propositions, metonymies and metaphors involving "heart" that I formulated through close reading of the text:

(1) Propositions:
   a. HEART IS THE CENTRAL FACULTY OF COGNITION
   b. HEART IS THE LOCUS OF MORAL SENSES AND VALUES
   c. HEART IS THE SEAT OF THE INNER SELF
   d. HEART IS A MICROCOSM OF THE UNIVERSE
   e. HEART IS SACRED AND HOLY

(2) Metonymies:
   a. HEART STANDS FOR MORALITY (CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED)
   b. HEART STANDS FOR HUMAN NATURE (CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED)

c. HEART STANDS FOR PERSON (PART FOR WHOLE)

(3) Metaphors:

a. HEART IS AN OBJECT
   HEART IS AN ORGANISM
   HEART IS A CONTAINER

b. BEING MORAL IS HAVING A CLEAN HEART
   MORAL IS CLEAN (MORAL IS GOOD + GOOD IS CLEAN)
   HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT

c. BEING IMMORAL IS HAVING A DIRTY HEART
   IMMORAL IS DIRTY (IMMORAL IS BAD + BAD IS DIRTY)
   HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT

d. BEING MORAL IS HAVING A BIG HEART
   MORAL IS BIG (MORAL IS GOOD + GOOD IS BIG)
   HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT

e. BEING IMMORAL IS HAVING A SMALL HEART
   IMMORAL IS SMALL (IMMORAL IS BAD + BAD IS SMALL)
   HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT

In (3), indention denotes either subversions, as under (3a), or constituents, as under (3b–e). In proposition (1a), traditional Chinese culture believes that the heart is the central faculty of cognition. What this cultural belief, expressed in (1a) as a proposition, means is that the heart plays all-inclusive mental functions: feeling, thinking, knowing, understanding, reasoning, judging, etc. That is, the heart is the faculty of thought, knowledge, reason, and judgment, as well as emotion. Thus, for instance, it is believed that the heart is the locus of the human "spirits," the totality of all spiritual and mental aspects of a person (line 6), including thinking, reasoning and judging (lines 26–27), and feeling and love (lines 43–46). The heart therefore guides one's actions (lines 11–12). Like one's "god," the heart is "all-inclusive," capable of comprehending the universe (lines 15–17). It is where one stores one's share of the Dao "Way" (lines 42–43), with which one can relate to the whole society and connect with "the heaven and earth and ten thousand things" (lines 30–32, 49–51, 57–58). That is "the reason why the Chinese people's heart is so important" (line 52 and a number of other places).

What is especially relevant to the essay under discussion is that the heart is culturally constructed as the locus of moral senses and values, as the proposition in (1b) states, since moral senses and values all originate and exist in the heart. This is why when the Chinese "talk about the issue of values, the issue of spiritual values," they "must trace it to the heart" (lines 61–62). This is also why the "function of finding the point of balance" between "the individual and the collective" comes from the heart (lines 26–27). While each heart exists as an "individual heart," it should also contribute to a "big collective heart," thus striking an ideal balance within itself between a "selfish heart" and a "public heart," or between an "individual heart" and a "collective heart" (lines 23–27). The so-called "individual heart" (line 23) and "unique heart" (line 33) represent one's inner or true self, i.e., HEART IS THE SEAT OF THE INNER SELF, which is the proposition in (1c). That is also why it is said that "Human hearts differ with their unique faces" (lines 22–23).

In ancient Chinese thought, the human being is believed to be a microcosm of the universe. However, since the heart, the critical organ of the body, is generally held as a metonymy or synecdoche for the person (see 2c; i.e., PART FOR WHOLE), it is then microcosmic of the whole universe, as the proposition (1d) states. Thus, as cited in this essay, "My heart is the universe; the universe is my heart" (line 17). Notably, the heart is also a microcosm of the universe when it is able to "reflect" or "contain" the "heaven and earth" and "ten thousand things" (lines 49–51, 57–58). This is what Zhuangzi suggested when he said that "The heaven and earth and ten thousand things are all one with me" (lines 30–31): "the heart should be expanded" so as to "reflect" or "contain" the whole universe (line 32; see also lines 46–51).

In traditional Chinese culture, because the heart is believed to be the central faculty of cognition and the microcosm of the universe, it is attached with special values to the extent of being sacred. This is what proposition (1e) says. Thus, it is regarded as "equivalent to a kind of god" (line 15), comparable with "the concept of God in the West" (lines 62–63) when equated to the whole universe. After all, the heart performs the crucial guiding function: it guides people's thoughts and actions (e.g. line 12). That is why the whole society and culture would fall into crises and turmoil when the heart has "gone bad" and "lost its locus" (lines 4, 59–60, 68–71). Good moral values and right moral senses are not only the contents inside the heart, but also the prop beneath it. Without its support, the heart will "fall."

The essay under discussion displays a strong "current" of metonymies and metaphors in its "flow" of discourse. Two obvious cases of metonymies are HEART STANDS FOR MORALITY in (2a) and HEART STANDS FOR HUMAN NATURE in (2b), both of them being instances of the more general metonymy CONTAINER STANDS FOR CONTAINED. This is because the heart is believed to be the organ of moral judgment and human nature. Thus, morality, compassion, benevolence, and so forth, all originate and exist in the heart. The heart is therefore conceived of as the "container" of moral values and dispositions of human nature. By the prototypical metonymy CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED, the "heart" is used referentially in the place of "morality" and "human nature." For instance, when the author speaks of "the Heart of China" being lost and the "loss of the Heart" being "one of the biggest keys to the crises of Chinese culture" (lines 68–71), he is talking about the loss of moral values and sense of morality in the minds of the Chinese. Also, when saying that having lost their heart "humans are not different from animals" (lines 63–64), the author is referring to the loss of human nature. Besides, the HEART FOR PERSON metonymy in (2c), which is an instantiation of the more general PART FOR WHOLE metonymy, is also manifested in the essay. For example, the statement that in China "everyone is a heart" (line 57) is based on the metonymic conceptualization that the heart, which is the central and critical organ of the body, can stand for the whole person. Similarly, we can say that the heart is a metonymy or synecdoche for the whole person when it is said that people's heart is "seduced by material profits" (lines 68–69). Furthermore, when the heart is said to be "the universe" (line 17), it stands for the person who is the microcosm of the universe.

While moral values and human nature are conceptualized metonymically in terms of the "heart," the "heart" itself is also understood metaphorically as an object, i.e. HEART IS AN OBJECT (3a), which can get "lost" (lines 68–71). This metaphor has two different forms: HEART IS AN ORGANISM and HEART IS A CONTAINER. As the HEART AS ORGANISM metaphor entails, the heart needs to be "cultivated" (lines 1–2, 58–59). When the heart is cultivated, it

will grow bigger and bigger. When one's heart is "big," one will "think of others" (lines 34, 48–51). That is why it is always desirable to "expand" and "enlarge" the heart (lines 28–32). The heart may be so "expanded" and "enlarged" that it can include "other people," the "whole society," and even "the heaven and earth and ten thousand things" in it (lines 28–32, 34, 48–51). When that happens, the heart becomes a microcosm of the universe. If not cultivated, the heart will "become smaller and smaller, and more and more selfish" (lines 58–60). As an object, one heart can be "compared with" another heart so that the difference between the two can be "seen" in comparison (lines 9–13). The heart can also be "pushed," and the act of pushing causes it to be "expanded" and "enlarged" (lines 46–51). As is obvious, the heart as an "object" is a "container" too. Thus, it is "empty" inside so that the "Dao" or "Way" can "enter into it" (lines 41–43). The HEART AS CONTAINER metaphor is also at work when the heart is said to include the "whole society" or "the heaven and earth and ten thousand things" in it (lines 28–32, 49).

In addition, two metaphorical entailments of the heart-object are very obvious throughout the essay: its degree of cleanness and its size, both of them being directly related to the values of morality. These two aspects are expressed by two pairs of "complex metaphors," which are combinations of "primary metaphors" and other components (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999). According to Lakoff and Johnson (1999, p. 46), primary metaphors pair subjective experience and judgment with sensorimotor experience, and each of them "has a minimal structure and arises naturally, automatically, and unconsciously through everyday experience by means of conflation, during which cross-domain associations are formed." So defined, a primary metaphor is an atomic component of the molecular structure of complex metaphors. In the essay under discussion, the first pair of complex metaphors is BEING MORAL IS HAVING A CLEAN HEART in (3b) and BEING IMMORAL IS HAVING A DIRTY HEART in (3c). They are respectively composed of the metaphors MORAL IS CLEAN and IMMORAL IS DIRTY in combination with HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT (to be discussed in detail below). Parallel to the CLEANNESS metaphor is the SIZE metaphor. Again, there is a pair of complex metaphors: BEING MORAL IS HAVING A BIG HEART in (3d) and BEING IMMORAL IS HAVING A SMALL HEART in (3e). These two complex metaphors contain MORAL IS BIG and IMMORAL IS SMALL respectively in combination again with HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT. That is why it is said in the essay that one needs to "cultivate" and "clean" one's heart. With a "clean" heart, one is morally good; if one has a "dirty" heart instead, one would be morally bad (lines 1–4). In the same vein, the size of one's heart, which is variable, is also related to one's morality. A "big" heart is metaphorical of moral goodness, whereas a "small" heart suggests metaphorically the lack of morality (lines 28–32, 46–51, 58–60). Therefore, it is morally good to "expand" and "enlarge" one's heart, and one is immoral when letting one's heart shrink to a smaller size. People with a "small heart" are mean and selfish, and necessarily narrow-minded; people with a "big heart" are caring and loving, and especially broad-minded, even having the whole universe "reflected" or "contained" in their heart. In sum, one's morality is distinguished, metaphorically, by two parameters of one's heart: its degree of cleanness and its size.

As aforementioned, complex metaphors are combinations of primary metaphors, other complex metaphors, and of cultural beliefs. In the following I attempt to show in detail how they may be combined at different levels, taking (3b) and (3c) as examples. The complex

metaphors in (3b) and (3c) can be decomposed into its components at different levels of combination, as shown in (4) and (5) below, where indention denotes lower-level components:

(4) Complex metaphor BEING MORAL IS HAVING A CLEAN HEART

a.	MORAL IS CLEAN	(a complex metaphor)
b.	MORAL IS GOOD	(a proposition)
c.	GOOD IS CLEAN	(a primary metaphor)
d.	HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT	(a complex metaphor)
e.	HEART IS THE SEAT OF MORALITY	(a proposition)
f.	HEART STANDS FOR MORALITY	(a metonymy)
g.	MORALITY IS A QUALITY	(a proposition)
h.	A QUALITY IS AN OBJECT	(a primary metaphor)

(5) Complex metaphor BEING IMMORAL IS HAVING A DIRTY HEART

a.	IMMORAL IS DIRTY	(a complex metaphor)
b.	IMMORAL IS BAD	(a proposition)
c.	BAD IS DIRTY	(a primary metaphor)
d.	HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT	(a complex metaphor)
e.	HEART IS THE SEAT OF MORALITY	(a proposition)
f.	HEART STANDS FOR MORALITY	(a metonymy)
g.	MORALITY IS A QUALITY	(a proposition)
h.	A QUALITY IS AN OBJECT	(a primary metaphor)

The decomposition of (4), the complex metaphor BEING MORAL IS HAVING A CLEAN HEART, is interpreted as follows. This metaphor arises from the combination of two lower-level complex metaphors: (4a) and (4d). Of these two, (4a) MORAL IS CLEAN, is composed of two lowest-level constituents: a proposition MORAL IS GOOD (4b) and a primary metaphor GOOD IS CLEAN (4c) that has arisen from pairing our subjective experience and judgment (GOOD and BAD) with our sensorimotor experience (CLEAN and DIRTY). As a primary metaphor, (4c) has a minimal structure that cannot be further decomposed, having arisen naturally from everyday experiential correlation in which cross-domain association (GOOD and CLEAN) is formed. The complex metaphor HEART FOR MORALITY IS AN OBJECT in (4d) is also subject to further decomposition into four lowest-level constituents in (4e–h). Thus, (4d) is interpreted as follows. As a complex metaphor, its target itself contains a metonymy HEART STANDS FOR MORALITY (4f), which is based on (4e) HEART IS THE SEAT OF MORALITY. As a proposition, (4e) is a cultural belief that grounds (4f). That is, because the heart is the seat of morality, it can metonymically stand for morality (i.e. CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED). While MORALITY IS A QUALITY in (4g) is a proposition, A QUALITY IS AN OBJECT in (4h) is a primary metaphor that pairs subjective experience (QUALITY) with sensorimotor experience (OBJECT). So interpreted, the complex metaphor BEING MORAL IS HAVING A CLEAN HEART in (4) has two important bases: the proposition HEART IS THE SEAT OF MORALITY in (4e) is its cultural basis whereas the metonymy HEART STANDS FOR MORALITY is its metonymic basis. The complex metaphor in (4), combined from (4a) and (4d), involves metaphor-metonymy interaction, which can be diagramed as in Figure 1. As shown in this figure, the target of a metaphor contains a metonymy (i.e. HEART FOR MORALITY or CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED), which involves a target-in-source mapping (see Ruiz de Mendoza Ibáñez & Otal Campo, 2002).



Figure 1: Metaphor-metonymy interaction in BEING MORAL IS HAVING A CLEAN HEART

The complex metaphor, BEING IMMORAL IS HAVING A DIRTY HEART, in (5) can be decomposed in exactly the same fashion. The only change consists in the complex metaphor in (5a), IMMORAL IS DIRTY, which is composed of a proposition IMMORAL IS BAD (5b) and a primary metaphor BAD IS DIRTY (5c). In a similar vein, the complex metaphors in (3d) and (3e) can be analyzed by the same decompositional approach. As we can see, the text of the essay on the "heart" is structured by a group of metaphors and metonymies that form a scaffold of conceptual relations. The network of the metaphoric and metonymic mappings and entailments can be illustrated by Figure 2. As shown in this Figure 2, the heart, which is culturally believed to be the central faculty of cognition in general and the organ of moral judgment and human nature in particular, stands metonymically for morality and human nature (CONTAINER FOR CONTAINED) and for the person (PART FOR WHOLE), represented by thick lines with open-headed arrows. That is, the heart as the container stands for the sense of morality and moral values stored inside it. Similarly, ever since the time of Mencius, human nature has been seen as the disposition of the heart, which is then supposed to be its container. Therefore, when the heart is "lost," human nature is gone, and humans are reduced to animals. Besides, the heart can stand for the whole person because it is the central faculty of cognition and the locus of the inner self.

It needs to be stressed that the "heart" in the essay under analysis is itself understood metaphorically in terms of "object." For one, it is an "object as organism" (i.e. a living being) and, for the other, it is an "object as container," although in effect these two cannot be completely separated from each other. Both versions of the OBJECT metaphor are bodily and metonymically based. In reality, the heart organ is indeed an "object," both as an organism and as a container. However, it is obvious that the author of the essay is not talking about our physical or biological heart. This heart-object can be "cultivated" as many organisms can, but our heart cannot. This heart-object can be "manipulated" (e.g. "compared," "pushed," "expanded," "given up," "lost," and it would "fall" when its "locus" of support is removed) as our heart cannot. Moreover, this heart-object can get "dirty" and be "cleaned" as our heart



Figure 2: The network of metaphoric and metonymic mappings and entailments in the essay

cannot. Finally, this heart-object can change its size drastically (e.g. "expanded" or "enlarged," or "becoming smaller and smaller") as our heart cannot. Both "organism" and "container" as metaphors of the heart have some entailments. Shown in the figure are highlighted ones in the essay. Thus, "Cultivation" is an entailment of "organism," and "Manipulation" is one of "container," whereas "Cleanness" and "Size" are shared by both. That is, both organism and container have physical dimensions, big or small, and they both can get dirty and be cleaned. It needs to be clarified that, although "Cultivation" and "Manipulation" are not listed as shared by "Organism" and "Container," these two entailments are tied to each other and can be possibly shared by both "Organism" and "Container."

In reality, an organism can be a container and a container can be organic, as is our heart organ. Thus, for instance, when the author of the essay cites Mencius as saying that people should "push their heart" so that it will "become bigger" and "reach further," even to "include the whole society" in it, the heart here is simultaneously an "organism" being "cultivated" (i.e. it is capable of growth and change) and a "container" being "manipulated" (i.e. it seems to be "pushed" from within and able to "contain" more). After all, both "Cultivation" and

"Manipulation" are entailments of "Object," the superordinate of "Organism" and "Container" in the figure.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the cultural models, consisting of those propositions, metonymies, and metaphors listed in (1–3), actually frame and structure the text of the essay like the skeleton of the body. It gives the essay its unity. More specifically, the scaffold of metaphoric and metonymic mappings and their entailments, as shown in Figure 2, provides the text with its coherence when the underlying conceptual metaphors and metonymies and their entailments are manifested at the surface level by linguistic expressions such as words, phrases, and sentences, which, emphasized by the italic font type, provides the text with its cohesion too. In short, this essay is a good example of how underlying conceptual metaphors and metonymies help create coherence of a text through their conceptual governance of surface linguistic expressions (see, e.g., Barcelona, 2005; Feng, 2004).

As Steen (2002) points out, many cognitive linguists have been concerned with the study of metaphor in language, but not many of them have paid attention to the study of metaphor in discourse and its cognitive processing. In this paper I have expanded my study into the territory of discourse, as found in an essay. In so doing, I have added another dimension to the research based on the studies of lexical items and linguistic expressions at the sentential level (see Yu, 2009a). In contrast to studies at the lexical and sentential levels, studies at the level of discourse can throw light on how conceptual metaphors frame texts in particular ways. In this paper, I have applied a more sophisticated decompositional approach to the functions of conceptual metaphors in such framing. I have shown that a metaphorical complex can be analyzed as being composed of various propositions, metonymies, and metaphors (both complex and primary), combined at different levels. It would be ideal if future studies could demonstrate how each of such components contributes to the overall process of textual framing.

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Appendix

新年话"心"

余英时

心对中国人来说最重要，因此你要修心。心要修得干净，有干干净净的心才有纯洁的社会出现的可能，如果心都脏了，坏了，那么这个社会也会坏。这不是唯心论，这是讲心的重要性，人的精神对物质条件也有很大的作用，并不是完全被物质条件或社会身份决定的。人要想大家都活得好，中国人讲"己所不欲，勿施于人"，孔子讲这种话，诗经讲这些，都是要将心比心，"他人有心，予忖度之"，我想他人的心是怎么样，要将心比心，就有一些事情不会做，所以中国人讲这个心是非常重要的。

中国为什么会特别讲这个心呢？因为在中国人看来，心等于是一种神，变化莫测，包罗一切，所以像有些哲学家，包括陆象山，王阳明，说到，吾心就是宇宙，宇宙就是吾心，这不是唯心论。而是说，你要建立一个人的社会，在这个社会大家都活得很好，要把心扩大，不要使自私自利的心。私心要有限度，这个限度就是不能妨害公心。

春秋时代的子产已经说了，人心不同，各有其面。所以中国人也肯定个人的心，但也有一个大群体的心同时运作，这样既不会流与所谓绝对的集体主义，也不会流与绝对的个人主义。在个人和集体之间找一种平衡点，找这个平衡点的功能要来自心。11 世纪的宋朝的张载有一篇文章，叫《大心篇》，把心放大。像战国时代的庄子讲，天地万物跟我都是一个。中国人也常常讲，天人合一，这都是讲心要扩大。

一方面不放弃个人自己独有的心，另外一方面又要把心扩大，想到别人，这样我们才能活得好些，有秩序一些。因为中国人不大相信有死后天堂，特别是受儒家影响的，认为这个世界就是一个真实的世界了。我们就这一个世界，要好好珍惜它。如果要珍惜它，我们的天堂也在这个世界上。我们的地狱也在这个世界上。这是中国人的一种看法。

孟子有《净心篇》，我们都知道的，知性就知天。庄子说，心要虚，虚了以后道才能进来。像孟子讲的，“恻隐之心，人皆有之”，像“仁义礼智”的“仁”就是人最要紧的心，这个“仁”就是爱人，爱别人，不但爱自己，也爱别人。所以孟子讲心，总要讲推，推自己的心，越推越大，越推越远，这样会包括整个社会，甚至要像惠师，庄周这些人，更推得大，要推到天地万物都要爱的。

所以这就是中国人的心之所以重要的原因，这个心变成每个人都有的了，这是中国思想上一个很特殊的传统。在中国传统之下，中国没有有组织的宗教，没有有组织的，像西方中央化的教会的传统，像在中古时代罗马教皇号令天下，中国没有发生过。中国人每个人都是一个心，每个人的心都可以通天。但是要培养它，如果不培养它，你的心就越来越小，越来越自私自利，那么社会就会大乱。

所以我想我们谈价值问题，精神的价值问题，在中国必须追究到心，跟西方的上帝的观念几乎有同样的重要意义，是不能去掉的。去掉后人就跟禽兽没有什么区别了。所以中国一向讲要把心搞干净。我想，中国的这一百年来，心实在是成为一个很大的问题，因为我们已经不大相信古代的说法了，把中国的传统丢掉了，然后又不能信仰西方的上帝，因此，心就没有着落了。每个人的心几乎被物质的利益所诱惑了。……在这样一个思潮之下，中国的心就越来越失落了。心的失落是我们一百年来中国文化危机最大的关键之一。

我向大家把心的问题提出来，好好想一想，这就是我新年想说的话。