The Influence of Culture and Strength of Cultural Identity on Individual Values in Japan and the United States

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Abstract

Two studies were conducted using data from Japan and the United States to examine the influence of the interaction between culture and strength of cultural identity on individual-level individualistic and collectivistic values. In the first study, culture and strength of cultural identity interacted to influence four values (freedom, pleasure, social recognition, and self-sacrifice). In the second study, culture and strength of cultural identity interacted to influence three values (being independent, harmony, and accepting traditions). The results suggest that strength of cultural identity must be taken into consideration in order to understand values that members of a culture hold.

Introduction

Values are an important aspect of human behavior. Rokeach (1972) suggests that people have values if they have enduring beliefs "that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to alternative modes of conduct or end-states of existence" (pp. 159-160). Ball-Rokeach, Rokeach, and Grube (1984) argue that values are the central core to individuals' personalities and have a direct effect on behavior. They contend that values serve as the major component of the personality that helps individuals maintain and enhance their self-esteem.

Individuals learn their values through the socialization process. Individuals'

behavior is affected by cultural values and the individual values they hold. Cultural values provide broad guidelines about what are acceptable means for achieving end-states in different situations and influence cultural norms and rules. Individual values provide specific guidelines for behavior across situations (Feather, 1990). Feather (1995) demonstrated that the values individuals hold are linked to the valences they attach to different behaviors. Gudykunst, Matsumoto, Ting-Toomey, Nishida, Kim, and Heyman (1996) demonstrated that individual-level values affect communication styles across cultures.

One way to study cultural values is by focusing on cultural individualism-collectivism (I-C). I-C is the major dimensions of cultural variability isolated by theorists across disciplines (e.g., Hofstede, 1980; Ito, 1989b; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Triandis, 1988, 1990, 1995). Schwartz and his associates (e.g., Schwartz, 1992, 1994a, 1994b, Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987, 1990) and other theorists (e.g., Chinese Culture Connection, 1987) have isolated values associated with cultural I-C. The values that are predominant in a culture influence the values that individuals learn, but individual value structures can be different from cultural value structures (see Schwartz, 1992, 1994b).[1]

There are many factors that can influence whether people from individualistic and collectivistic cultures hold individual-level individualistic or collectivistic values. One important factor is whether people identify strongly or weakly with being members of their cultures. People who strongly identify with their culture should hold individual values that are consistent with cultural-level values, while people who do not strongly identify with their culture probably hold some individual values that are inconsistent with cultural-level values.

Two cultures where there are clear differences in cultural-level values based on I-C, and where there are inconsistent results regarding individual-level values are Japan and the United States (Gudykunst & Nishida, 1994). The purpose of this paper is to present data from two studies in the United States and Japan on the extent to which strength of cultural identity interacts with culture to influence the individual-level values people hold.

Individualism-Collectivism and Values

In order to explain individual behavior within and across cultures, it is necessary to understand how I-C operates at the cultural- and individual-levels. In this section, we will overview I-C values at the two levels of analysis.

Cultural Level

Individualistic cultures emphasize the goals of the individual over group goals, while collectivistic cultures stress group goals over individual goals (Triandis, 1988, 1990, 1995). In individualistic cultures, individuals assume responsibility for

themselves and their immediate family only.[2] In collectivistic cultures, individuals belong to collectivities or ingroups which look after them in exchange for the individuals' loyalty (Hofstede, 1980). Ingroups are "groups of people about whose welfare one is concerned, with whom one is willing to cooperate without demanding equitable returns, and separation from whom leads to discomfort or even pain" (Triandis, 1988, p. 75). Triandis (1988) contends that ingroups are more important in collectivistic than individualistic cultures. Lebra (1976), for example, points out that collectivism "involves cooperation and solidarity, and the sentimental desire for the warm feeling of *ittaikan* ("feeling of oneness") with fellow members of one's group" (p. 25) and that this feeling is shared widely in Japan.

Most scholars agree that the United States is an individualistic culture and Japan is a collectivistic culture (see Gudykunst & Nishida, 1994).[3] Critiques of the group model of Japanese society (e.g., Befu, 1980a, 1980b), however, suggest that acceptance of this model with its emphasis on harmony and *giri* (voluntary feelings of obligation) leads scholars to overlook Japanese "personhood" (e.g., concepts such as *seishin* or *jinkaku*).[4] Befu (1980b), for example, argues that *seishin* deals with "individuals qua individuals." Befu (1980a, 1980b) believes that the group model (collectivism as used here) can explain public matters, but not private matters. This contention is supported by two studies of value orientations in Japan. Caudill and Scarr (1961) and Nishida (1981) found that while collaterality predominates in Japan, the value orientation (collaterality, lineality, individualism) individuals select depends on the specific sphere of life being examined.[5]

Hamaguchi's (1980) research suggests that Japanese working in corporations who were born before World War II clearly are collectivistic (or contextualists to use his term). There appear to be trends for younger Japanese, however, to be more individualistic. Miyanaga (1991) also points out that there has been a growing individualism among people on the periphery of Japanese culture (e.g., artists, people in the fashion industry, people in small businesses) since the end of the war. She sees this "'dropping out' of established groups for the purpose of self-realization" as a form of "passive individualism" (p. 4).

Focusing only on the individualistic tendencies in the United States leads scholars to overlook collectivistic aspects of the culture (e.g., Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Nishida, 1981; Waterman, 1981; Wuthnow, 1991). Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, for example, point out that while individualism predominates in the United States, collaterality and lineality (two forms of collectivism) also affect behavior. Nishida found that while individualism predominates overall in the United States, the value orientation (individualism, collaterality, lineality) individuals select depends on the specific sphere of life being examined.[6]

Hofstede and Bond (1984) isolated cultural dimensions of values using data from the Rokeach (1973) value survey. They observed a value function consisting of salvation and an exciting life that correlated with Hofstede's (1980) individualism dimension at the cultural level.

Schwartz (1994b) isolated cultural-level values associated with I-C. He suggests that conservatism is related to collectivism. Conservatism is the culture-level value type that focuses on "those values likely to be important in societies based on close-knit harmonious relations, in which the interests of the person are not viewed as distinct from those of the group" (p. 101). Intellectual and affective autonomy are related to individualism. These values are those "likely to be important in societies that view the person as an autonomous entity entitled to pursue his or her individual interests and desires. Two related aspects of autonomy appear to be distinguishable: a more intellectual emphasis on self-direction and a more affective emphasis on stimulation and hedonism" (p. 102). Schwartz's study did not reveal differences between Japan and the United States on conservatism (US=3.90, J=3.87). There was a small difference on affective autonomy in the expected direction (US=3.65, J=3.54), but the difference in affective autonomy was opposite the expected direction (US=4.20, J=4.68).

The Chinese Culture Connection (1987) examined cultural values from a Chinese perspective. In their study of Chinese respondents in 21 cultures, they isolated a social integration factor that correlated with collectivism in Hofstede's (1980) data. This factor included values such as tolerance of others, harmony with others, non-competitiveness, filial piety, respect for tradition, and observation of rites and social rituals. Japan had a higher score (4.97) on this dimension than the United States (2.84).

I-C at the cultural level has been used widely to explain cultural differences in different types of behavior (see Triandis, 1990, for a summary). Kashima (1989), however, points out that there are problems with using dimensions of cultural variability to explain individual level behavior. One area where there are problems is the area of developing causal explanations; it is impossible to test causal explanations of behavior based on cultural level explanations (e.g., culture cannot be controlled in an experiment). The second area where there are problems is in mapping individualistic and collectivistic cultures. Hofstede (1980) and the Chinese Culture Connection (1987) present cultural level scores regarding various dimensions of cultural variability, including I-C. When specific samples are collected, however, they do not necessarily correspond with the cultural level scores. To illustrate, when college students are sampled in Japan and the United States, the Japanese college students often are more individualistic than the college students in the United States (Triandis *et al.*, 1988). I-C at the individual level, therefore, must be taken into consideration.

Individual Level

There are at least three related, but distinct ways to conceptualize I-C at the individual level: as personality characteristics (e.g., idiocentrism-allocentrism; Triandis *et al.*, 1985), as value differences (e.g., Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987), and as self construals (e.g., Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Our focus here is on individualistic and collectivistic values.

The influence of cultural I-C on individuals' behavior is mediated by their values (Gudykunst *et al.*, 1996). Cultural-level values based on I-C have a direct influence on behavior (e.g., through the norms and rules of the culture), but there is also an indirect effect through the socialization process when people learn individual values. While there generally is consistency between cultural and individual values, there are differences (Schwartz, 1994b).

Schwartz (1992) isolates 11 motivational domains of individual values. Value domains specify the structure of values and consist of specific values. Schwartz argues that the interests served by the 11 value domains can be individualistic, collectivistic, or mixed. The value domains of stimulation (e.g., exciting life), hedonism (e.g., pleasure), power (e.g., authority), achievement (e.g., social recognition), and self-direction (e.g., independent) serve individual interests; the value domains of tradition (e.g., respect for tradition), conformity (e.g., self-discipline), and benevolence (e.g., helpful) serve collective interests; and the value domains of security (e.g., social order), universalism (e.g., equality), and spirituality (e.g., inner harmony) serve mixed interests. Schwartz (1990) contends that individuals hold both individualistic and collectivistic values and that they are not necessarily in conflict.

There have been numerous studies of values in Japan and the United States (e.g., Berrien, 1966; Berrien, Arkoff, & Iwahara, 1967; Caudill & Scarr, 1961; Kikuchi & Gordon, 1968, 1970; Gudykunst *et al.*, 1996; Nishida, 1981; Rokeach, 1973; Triandis, 1972). Triandis, for example, discovered that Japanese value serenity, aesthetic satisfaction, contentment, self-confidence, responsibility, peace, and good adjustment. US Americans, in contrast, valued individual progress, self-confidence, status, serenity, achievement, and joy. Rokeach found that US Americans value materialistic achievement more than Japanese, but Japanese valued hedonism more than US Americans. More recently, Gudykunst *et al.* observed that there are no differences in individualistic values between their US American and Japanese samples (US=5.85, J=5.80), but the Japanese sample held more collectivistic values than the US American sample (US=4.77, J=5.02).

The results of the studies of individual level values in Japan and the United States, as well as other cultures, do not consistently fit the expected patterns given

the cultural-level individualistic and collectivistic tendencies of the cultures (see Zavalloni, 1980, for summaries of numerous studies). One reason that the findings are not consistent with the general cultural values is that the socialization process is not deterministic; some people become individualists in collectivistic cultures, and some people become collectivists in individualistic cultures. One potential explanation for this is cultural changes taking place in different sphere of the two cultures (see earlier discussion of cultural I-C).

There is an alternative explanation that might explain why some Japanese do not hold collectivistic values; that is, people who tend to be individualistic do not identify strongly with the Japanese culture. Similarly, people who tend to hold collectivistic values in the United States may not strongly identify with the culture of the United States. We discuss strength of cultural identity in the next section.

Strength of Cultural Identity and Individual Values

Cultural identity is one of many social identities individuals have. Social identities are those parts of an "individual's self-concept which derives from his [or her] knowledge of his [or her] membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Social identities can be based on demographic categories (e.g., nationality, ethnicity), membership in formal or informal organizations, the roles individuals play, vocation, or membership in stigmatized groups. Social identities influence behavior (including the use of language and communication behaviors) when they are activated (see Abrams & Hogg, 1990, for evidence).

Billig (1995) argues that our national cultural identities are "flagged" in the mass media through the use of symbols and habits of language. Symbols and language usage remind individuals of their culture, but they operate mindlessly (i.e., beyond conscious awareness). Berry (1980) points out that cultural identity provides a frame of reference for how individuals define themselves, and it also provides "a frame of reference for ordering social relationships" (p. 258). He proposes a model that combines cultural and ethnic identities to define how individuals fit into their culture (i.e., individuals are categorized as integrated, assimilated, separated, or marginal; see also Berry, 1990, for a discussion of the model).

The majority of research on cultural identity has used it as a factor to explain how people respond to living in multicultural contexts (e.g., Berry, 1980, 1990; Betancourt & Lopez, 1993), as well as how individuals respond in new cultural contexts (e.g., Kosmitzki, 1996). Zavalloni (1972, 1975) suggests that social identities (including cultural identity) that individuals activate affect the values they hold across cultures.

The strength of individuals' cultural identities should influence the individual values people hold. Strength of cultural identity involves the degree to which individuals identify with being members of their cultures. Stated differently, it includes the importance individuals place on being members of their culture and the centrality cultural membership has in defining who they are. It appears reasonable to assume that strength of cultural identity should interact with culture to influence the individualistic and collectivistic values people hold. To illustrate, students in Japan and the United States who strongly identify with their cultures should hold different values than those who do not strongly identify with their cultures. Students in Japan who strongly identify with their culture should hold collectivistic values, while students who do not strongly identify might hold individualistic values. Students in the United States who strongly identify with their culture, in contrast, should hold individualistic values, while those who do not strongly identify might hold collectivistic values.

Data from two studies were used to test the predictions regarding cultural identity outlined here. Given that both studies test the same predictions, the results for each study will be presented and then the findings will be discussed.

Study I

Methods

Respondents. Three hundred and sixty-four students in Japan and the United States served as respondents: 210 (104 males and 94 females, 12 people did not identify their sex) from a large southwestern university in the United States and 164 (68 males and 94 females, two did not identify their sex) from a moderate sized private university east of Tokyo in Japan. The average age of the Japan sample was 20.56 years (SD=1.50), while the average age of the United States sample was 21.96 years (SD=3.98).

Measurement. All measures were contained in a questionnaire booklet that was constructed in English and translated into Japanese (with back translation).[7] Strength of cultural identity was based on a three semantic differential type items (with a six point response scale): Being a member of my culture is (1) not important to my self-definition-important for my self-definition, (2) does not define me-defines me, and (3) not central to who I am-central to who I am. Reliability (alpha) was .76 in the United States sample and .73 in the Japan sample. The three items were averaged within cultures and a median split was used to define weak and strong identification (US median=4.33, Japan median=3.50).

Eight values derived from Rokeach's (1973) value survey were utilized in the

present study: (1) "cooperation; i.e., working together with others," (2) "freedom; i.e., independence, free choice," (3) obedience; i.e., doing what parents, bosses direct," (4) "pleasure; i.e., an enjoyable fun life," (5) "self-sacrifice; i.e., altruism, helping others at a cost," (6) "self-reliance; i.e., independence from others," (7) "equality; i.e., brotherhood or equal opportunity for all," and (8) "social recognition; i.e., respect, admiration from others." A six-point response scale was used: not at all important (1) - very important (6).

Results

Multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was used to test the predictions. The eight values were the dependent measures, while culture (Japan vs. United States) and strength of cultural identity (weak vs. strong; abbreviated ID below) were the independent variables.

The culture X strength of cultural identity multivariate interaction was significant (Wilk's lambda=.95, F[8,327]=1.96, p< .05). Four univariate tests were significant or approached significance: freedom (F[1,334]=3.60, p=.06, eta^2=.01), pleasure (F[1,334]=6.63, p<.01, eta^2=.02), self-sacrifice (F[1,334]=3.06, p=.08, eta^2=.01), and social recognition (F[1,334]=4.15, p<.05, eta^2=.01).[8] Respondents in the United States who identified strongly with their culture had higher scores for freedom (M=5.48) than those who identified weakly with the culture (M=5.30; t=1.80, p<.05), while the opposite pattern (but non-significant) emerged in the Japanese sample (weak ID=5.36, strong ID=5.22, t<1, p=ns). US Americans who identified strongly with their culture had a higher mean for pleasure (M=5.50) than those who weakly identified with their culture (M=5.16, t=3.40, p<.05), while the pattern in the Japanese sample was the opposite but not significant (weak ID=5.27, strong ID=5.16, t<1, p= ns). A similar pattern emerged for social recognition in the United States (weak ID=4.67, strong ID=5.08, t=2.93, p<.05), but there was little difference by strength of identification in the Japanese sample (weak ID=4.51, strong ID=4.57, t<1, p=ns). For self-sacrifice, the Japanese respondents who identified strongly with the culture had a higher score (4.09) than those who had weak identification (3.69, t=2.0, p<.05). There was little difference in self-sacrifice by strength of identification in the United States sample (weak ID=4.39, strong ID=4.31, t<1, p=ns).

The multivariate main effect for strength of cultural identity was not significant (Wilk's lambda=.97, F[8,327]=1.25, p=ns). The multivariate main effect for culture was significant (Wilk's lambda=.84, F[8,327]=7.69, p<.001). Three of the univariate tests were significant: self-sacrifice (F[1,334]=12.95, p<.001, eta^2=.04), self-reliance (F[1,334]=25.98, p<.001, eta^2=.08), and social recognition (F[1,334]=7.55, p<.01, eta^2=.02). The means in the United States sample were higher than the means in the Japan sample for self-sacrifice and social recognition.

The mean for self-reliance was higher in the Japan sample than in the United States sample. The results for self-sacrifice and self-reliance are inconsistent with cultural values in Japan and the United States. Means are presented in Table 1.

Table 1. Means of the Variables in Study I

	Japan		United States	
	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong
Cooperation	4.72	4.90	4.76	4.99
Freedom	5.36	5.22	5.30	5.48
Obedience	3.83	4.01	3.80	4.21
Pleasure	5.27	5.16	5.16	5.50
Self-sacrifice	3.69	4.09	4.39	4.31
Self-reliance	5.35	5.28	4.76	4.74
Equality	5.21	5.22	5.24	5.19
Social recognition	4.51	4.57	4.64	5.08

Study II

Methods

Respondents. Four hundred and thirty-two college students from Japan and the United States served as respondents in the study: 247 (109 males, 137 females, with one unidentified) students from a moderate-sized university on the west coast in the United States and 185 (89 males, 95 females, one unidentified) from a moderate-sized university east of Tokyo in Japan. The average age of the United States sample was 22.16 (SD=5.31), while the average age of the Japanese sample was 21.04 (SD=5.55).

Measurement. The measures were contained in a questionnaire booklet that was constructed in English and translated to Japanese (with back translation).[9] Strength of cultural identity was measured the same as in Study I, except a seven point response scale was used instead of a six point scale as in Study I. Reliability was .75 in the United states sample and .72 in the Japan sample. The medians were 4.33 in the United States sample and 4.00 in the Japanese sample.

Ten values were adapted from Schwartz's (1990) description of individualistic and collectivistic values: (1) "obtaining pleasure or sensuous gratification," (2) "restraining my behavior if it is going to harm others," (3) "being successful by demonstrating individual competency," (4) "preserving and enhancing the welfare

of others," (5) "being independent in thought and action," (6) "safety and stability of people with whom I identify," (7) "obtaining status and prestige," (8) "harmony in my relations with others," (9) "having an exciting and challenging life," and (10) "accepting my cultural and religious traditions." A seven-point response scale was used: not at all important (1) - extremely important (7).

Results

The data were tested using MANOVA. Culture (Japan vs. United States) and strength of cultural identity (weak vs. strong) were treated as independent variables. The ten individualistic and collectivistic values were the dependent variables.

The culture X strength of cultural identity multivariate interaction was significant (Wilk's lambda=.95, F[10,408]=2.30, p<.01). Three values were significant or approached significance: being independent (F[1,417]=8.62, p<.01, eta^2=.02), having harmony (F[1,417]=2.19, p=.10, eta^2=.01), and accepting traditions (F[1,417]=3.50, p=.06, eta^2=.01). Examination of the mean scores indicates that for being independent the Japanese mean for the weak identification group was higher (5.45) than for the strong identification group (4.83, t=3.11, p<.05), while the means for the two groups in the United States sample were about the same (weak ID=5.98, strong ID=5.93, t<1, p=ns). For harmony and accepting traditions, the mean in the Japanese sample for the strong identifiers was higher (harmony=6.30, traditions=4.43) than for the weak identifiers (harmony=6.07, traditions=3.73; harmony t=1.85, p<.05, traditions t=2.50, p<.05). The means for both variables were approximately the same in the weak (harmony=6.27, traditions=5.01) and the strong (harmony=6.18, traditions=5.13) identification conditions in the United States sample (harmony t<1, p=ns, traditions t<1, p=ns).

The multivariate main effect for culture was significant (Wilk's lambda=.57, F[10,408]=29.73, p<.001). Six univariate effects were significant: obtaining pleasure (F[1,417]=142.38, p<.001, eta^2=.25), preserving others' welfare (F[1,417]=31.90, p<.001, eta^2=.07), being independent (F[1,417]=36.12, p<.001, eta^2=.08), safety (F[1,417]=6.44, p<.01, eta^2=,02), exciting life (F[1,417]=64.98, p<.001, eta^2=.13), and accepting traditions (F[1,417]=28.61, p<.001, eta^2=.06). The means for all of the variables except obtaining pleasure were higher in the United States sample than in the Japan sample. The results for preserving others' welfare, obtaining pleasure, and accepting traditions were not consistent with the cultural-level values in Japan and the United States. Means are presented in Table 2.

Table 2. Means of the Variables in Study II

	Japan		United States	
	Weak	Strong	Weak	Strong
Obtaining pleasure and sensuous gratification	6.60	6.58	5.38	5.33
Restraining my behavior if it is going to harm others	6.00	5.86	5.87	5.77
Being successful by demonstrating my individual competency	5.85	6.05	5.80	6.03
Preserving and enhancing welfare of others	4.52	4.77	5.48	5.41
Being independent in thought and action	5.45	4.83	5.93	5.99
Safety and stability of people with whom I identify	5.48	5.43	5.72	5.84
Obtaining status and prestige	4.93	5.13	4.81	5.30
Having harmony in my relations with others	6.07	6.30	6.27	6.18
Having an exciting and challenging life	4.90	4.88	5.99	6.02
Accepting my cultural and religious traditions	3.73	4.43	5.02	5.14

The multivariate main effect for strength of cultural identity was significant (Wilk's lambda=.93, $F[10,408]=3.18$, $p<.001$). Four univariate effects were significant or approached significance: being successful ($F[1,417]=3.04$, $p=.08$, $eta^2=.01$), being independent ($F[1,417]=5.60$, $p<.05$, $eta^2=.01$), obtaining status ($F[1,417]=6.11$, $p<.05$, $eta^2=.01$), and accepting traditions ($F[1,417]=8.27$, $p<.01$, $eta^2=.02$). The means for being independent and accepting traditions were lower for weak identifiers than for strong identifiers. The means for being successful and obtaining status, in contrast, were higher for strong identifiers than for weak identifiers.

Discussion

The purpose of the present research was to determine the extent to which strength of cultural identity interacts with culture to influence individual-level individualistic and collectivistic values. The data from both studies indicate that culture interacts with strength of cultural identity to influence individual-level individualistic and collectivistic values. Specifically, the present data suggest that if the values of freedom, pleasure, social recognition, self-sacrifice, being independent, harmony, and accepting traditions are studied at the individual level, strength of cultural identity must be taken into consideration. All of the interaction effects that emerged in the present study were consistent with expectations based on cultural I-C in Japan and the United States. To illustrate, respondents who strongly identify with the Japanese culture valued harmony and accepting traditions more than respondents who did not identify strongly with the Japanese culture or respondents from the United States.

With the exception of three values (social recognition, being independent and exciting life), the results for the main effect of culture on values in the two studies were not consistent with expectations based on cultural I-C values in the two cultures. The Japanese respondents were more self-reliant, more pleasure seeking, less self-sacrificing, less interested in preserving others' welfare, less accepting of traditions, and less safety oriented than the United States respondents. The patterns for social recognition, being independent and exciting life, however, were consistent with expectations (i.e., scores for United States respondents were higher than scores for Japan respondents on these three values). The present data clearly indicate that respondents in the United States and Japan hold individualistic and collectivistic values. Further, the present study suggests that individual-level values often are not consistent with cultural-level values when only culture is used as an independent variable.

There are three major implications of the present study. The first implication is that strength of cultural identity is an important factor that cannot be ignored when studying variability in communication across cultures. People's personality, the way they conceive of themselves, and the values they hold are influenced by the socialization process. While many (probably most) members of a culture learn patterns that are consistent with cultural-level tendencies, not all members of the culture learn patterns consistent with the cultural-level tendencies. Strength of cultural identity provides one way of differentiating people who behave in ways that are consistent with the general cultural-level tendencies.

The second implication of the present study involves the importance of including individual-level factors that mediate the effect of cultural-level variability (e.g., cultural I-C) on communication in future research. To illustrate, Gudykunst *et al.* (1996) argue that while cultural I-C has a direct effect on communication (e.g., through communication rules used in a culture), personality orientations, self-

construals, and individual values also mediate the influence of cultural I-C on communication. Both cultural-level and individual-level values may influence communication in the same situation. Since cultural-level and individual-level values are not necessarily consistent, both must be taken into consideration to understand communication across cultures.

The third implication of the present study involves the way researchers demonstrate that their samples are representative of the cultural tendencies (e.g., cultural I-C) under study. Triandis and his associates (1988) suggest that college students in Japan may not provide an adequate sample if researchers are trying to test the effects of collectivism on individuals' behavior. The present research suggests that demonstrating whether samples are individualistic or collectivistic cannot be accomplished by simply assessing individual-level values. The present data indicate that individuals' strength of cultural identity interacts with their cultural background to influence their individualistic and collectivistic values.

It is critical that future research make very specific predictions regarding the linkages between the cultural and individual-level aspects of I-C and individuals' behavior (e.g., cultural-level: strong identifiers in cultures which value conservatism will follow cultural rules more than strong identifiers in cultures which do not value conservatism; individual-level: the more individuals value being independent, the more they will self-disclose with members of outgroups). Isolating very specific relationships between particular aspects of I-C at the cultural level and at the individual level to individuals' behavior is necessary to understand the influences of the cultural- and individual- levels of analysis on communication.

Notes

1. Schwartz (1992), for example, points out that power and authority at the cultural level are given priority in collectivistic cultures, but they tend to serve individual interests at the individual level; loyalty and responsibility at the cultural level are given priority in individualistic cultures, but they serve collective interests at the individual level.
2. If there is a conflict between individual values and family values, high individualists probably will follow their own values.
3. While these terms are not heavily value laden in the United States, the translations of both terms are value laden in Japan. Ito (1989b), for example, points out that Japanese scholars do not use the translation of the term collectivism, *zentaishugi*, because it often is used to refer to dictatorial political systems. Rather, they use terms like group oriented (*shudanshugi*; Nakane,

1970), contextualism (*kanjinshugi*; Hamaguchi, 1980), or inter-individualism (*saijinshugi*; Ito, 1989a). Ito (1989b) also points out that the term used for individualism in Japanese, *kojinshugi*, has negative connotations (e.g., selfishness).

4. See Mito (1991), Murakami (1983), and Yamazaki (1990) for recent discussions of Japanese individualism.
5. Caudill and Scarr (1961), for example, found that collaterality predominates in Japan for family/work relations (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck's, 1961, question R3) and personal property inheritance (R6), while individualism predominates for choice of delegates (R4) and wage work (R5). Nishida (1981) found that collaterality predominated for choice of delegate (R4), bridge building (R1), and wage work (R5), while individualism predominated in family/work relations (R3), property inherence (R6), and land inheritance (R7).
6. Nishida (1981) found the same pattern for North Americans as for the Japanese (see previous note).
7. We want to thank Yoko Nadamitsu and Jiro Sakai for their assistance in translating and coding the data from this study.
8. Cramer and Bock (1966) point out that univariate tests that approach significance should be interpreted if the multivariate test is significant.
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