[The diagrams in this article are not available in the online version]

Transcultural Speechmaking Principles
-Mechanisms of Linear Logic and Configural Logic-

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Abstract

Although scholars differentiate between the rationalities of Western and Eastern rhetorics as "linear" logic and "configural" logic, very little research has investigated configural logic. This study aims to explain the mechanisms of both linear and configural logics, by analyzing American (will also be referred to as Western) rhetoric and Japanese (will also be referred to as Eastern) rhetoric with the Toulmin model and Aristotelian reasoning. Furthermore, this study will present the mutual framework shared by both linear and configural logics, and then suggest transcultural speechmaking principles.

Linear Logic and Configural Logic

The term "linear logic" represents the logic system traditionally employed in Western rhetoric. "Configural logic," on the other hand, "represents a wide variety of contrastive logic systems used by a number of Eastern, Native American, and some Latino cultures" (Kearney & Plax, 1996, p. 238). Although "a number of recent intercultural writers acknowledge that configural logic patterns exist. . . very little research has been done on the precise kinds of patterns that do characterize configural logic" (p. 238).

Hence, in this paper, configural logic patterns will be examined, in comparison to the more researched system of linear logic. First, the mechanism of linear logic will be explained based on the analysis of American rhetoric. Secondly, the mechanism of configural logic will be characterized based on the analysis of Japanese rhetoric. (In both analyses, the Toulmin model and Aristotelian reasoning will be employed.) Finally, transcultural speechmaking principles which are common to both linear and configural logics will be suggested.

Mechanism of Linear Logic

A traditional Western speech, which is constructed with linear logic, generally consists of three parts: introduction, body, and conclusion. The introduction presents a thesis, and previews how the speech is going to proceed. The body provides two or more main points. These points are laid out in a linear order and are connected by signposts such as "first of all," "secondly," and "finally." The typical organizational patterns of main points include: chronological, topical, spatial, cause-and-effect, and problem-and-solution orders. Each point has to be supported with evidence, which usually means facts, statistics, or authentic quotations. The conclusion summarizes the main ideas and reinforces the thesis of a speech. (See figure 1.)

Figure 1. The Structure of Linear Logic (American Rhetoric)

For communication scholars who have studied the structure of linear logic, this model shown in Figure 1 may be quite familiar. However, this point of view is only from the perspective of the speaker, and not from the communicative relationship between the speaker and the audience. The whole linear logic system can be further analyzed by using the Toulmin model and Aristotelian reasoning–the two major structures of reasoning in contemporary American rhetoric.

What scholars call Toulmin's model is actually the concept of "six elements of a unit of proof" by Douglas Ehninger and Wayne Brockriede (1963). Ehninger and Brockriede modified Toulmin's terminology to make it easier to understand, and their terminology now seems more common in the field. According to them, "proof is the process of securing belief in one statement by relating it to another statement already believed. A unit of proof has six elements, three of which, *evidence*, *warrant*, and *claim*, are absolutely indispensable" (p. 99). "Evidence may be defined . . . as an informative statement believed by the listener or reader and employed by an arguer to secure belief in another statement" (p. 100). "A *warrant* is the means by which one moves from *evidence* to *claim*," and it is "hypothetical" (p. 101). A *warrant* is like a bridge between *evidence* and *claim* and make these two elements "be associated in such a way that the truth or probability of the first comes to stand as certificate for the truth or probability of the second" (p. 101). And "*claim* is the explicit appeal produced by the *evidence* and *warrant*, the specific stand which, as a result of accepting the data and recognizing the validity of the reasoning, one is now prepared to take on the question under consideration" (p. 102). (See the following diagram.)

(diagram)

These *indispensable elements of a unit of proof* are almost identical with "evidence," "main point," and "thesis" in the Structure of Linear Logic (Figure 1). Evidence supports the main point, and the main point supports the thesis of a speech. (See the following diagram.)

(diagram)

Ehninger and Brockriede also present three additional proof elements, which are "*support for the warrant*," "*reservations*," and "*qualifier*" (p. 105*). "Support for the warrant* is intended to certify the acceptability of the assumption that the warrant expresses" (p. 105). "The *reservation* qualifies or limits the area to which the claim may apply . . . by recognizing certain exceptional circumstances that reduce or refute the force of a claim" (p. 106). And *qualifier* expresses "the degree of force a claim is judged to possess" (p. 106), and includes such terms as "possibly," "probably," and "presumably." (See the following diagram.)

(diagram)

These elements are clearly evident not only within argumentation of a debate, but also within the system of linear logic. A speaker's thesis is the *claim* which is based on the *warrant* called main point. The main point is supported with *evidence* and *support for the warrant*. The conclusion reinforces the thesis (*claim*) with certain modality defined as *qualifier*. Although the other element, *reservations*, is not included in the Structure of Linear Logic (Figure 1), the speaker has to always prepare for and overcome possible opposing ideas that the audience may have. Thus, it is vital for an argument or a speech to include sufficient refutation to oppose any probable rebuttals. (See the following diagram.)

(diagram)

The other major methodology of persuasion in contemporary American rhetoric is inductive reasoning and deductive reasoning, which have their origins in Aristotle's *example* and *enthememe*. Usually, inductive reasoning is "arguing from specific cases to more general conclusions," and deductive reasoning is "moving from overall theories or generally accepted principles to conclusions about specific cases" (Hollihan & Baaske, 1994, p. 75) In the relationship between "main point" and "evidence" in Figure 1, such reasoning between specific and general is evident. Several pieces of evidence such as facts, statistics, and quotations support one main point *inductively* when they draw a generalization between the pieces; one piece of evidence supports one main point *deductively* when it works as a sign of a generalization. On the whole, the mechanism of linear logic is described in Figure 2 on the next page.

Traditionally, Western rhetoric has been developed based on argumentation in which a speaker confronts his or her opponents and uses convincing evidence that will refute possible rebuttals. Linear logic is the outcome of this longtime process of methodological development.

Mechanism of Configural Logic

Kearney and Plax state:

> Whereas linear logic is direct and straightforward, configural logic is more indirect. Speakers using configural logic are not likely to provide a preview of the main points or spell out a specific conclusion. They explore issues from a variety of tangential views or examples. Links between main points are not made explicitly; direction is only implied.
> (p. 238)

Although these observations seem accurate, the differences between linear logic and configural logic need to be defined more precisely. Configural logic is different from linear logic in terms of (a) the structure (or the organizational pattern), (b) the materials supporting a point, and most significantly, (c) the relationship between the speaker and the audience. The proceeding is the analysis of Japanese rhetoric, which explains exactly what these differences are.

Structure/Organizational Pattern

The typical organizational pattern in Japanese rhetoric is the structure called:

"*ki-shoo-ten-ketsu* ( )" (Hinds, 1983).

This four-part structure is rooted in classical Chinese poetry. In the simplest form of Chinese poetry, which consists of four lines, each line represents different stages of the four parts. These stages include (1) set-up, (2) development, (3) transition, and (4) connection. According to Takashi Ezure (1992), the set-up stage is where a poet starts his or her statement. In the development stage, the poet deepens this statement. In the transition stage, he or she switches the flow of the poem by presenting a totally unrelated idea. Finally, in the connection stage, the poet ties up these two different ideas, and concludes the whole poem.

Ezure explains that the two key principles of this four-part structure are: (a) a poet should divert the reader's prediction by creating a gap between the second and the third stages; (b) he or she must put these two different matters together in the last stage (p. 180). The reader of such poetry is not supposed to be able to see the poet's intention until he or she reaches the last stage; once he or she reaches the conclusion, the reader can then develop an overall meaning of the poem. The beginning and the ending of the poem are put together, and each stage becomes linked in a cyclical manner.

Ki-shoo-ten-ketsu is considered the most effective kind of structure in Japanese literature (Oosumi, 1991). In Japan, for example, many textbooks on writing suggest that students construct their essays based on this four-part structure. In addition, several Japanese writing texts for non-native speakers often *introduce ki-shoo-ten-ketsu.* Although speechmaking principles in Japan are not as developed as they are in the United States, the structure of *ki-shoo-ten-ketsu* is also evident in oral presentations by Japanese people. For instance, an educational program for oral communications by NHK, the Japanese national television/radio station, discusses this four-part structure. One of the program's texts states that the principle of speech construction is: (1) get the audience's attention; (2) develop the speech without losing the listeners' attention; (3) establish a climax; and (4) lead the audience to recognize the speaker's intention and conclude the speech (Kato, 1989).

Figure 3. A Structure of Configural Logic (Japanese Rhetoric)

Interestingly, the structure of *ki-shoo-ten-ketsu* has almost the same structure as storytelling in American rhetoric. In their public speaking textbook, Beebe and Beebe (1994) explain that "most good stories follow a four-part structure: (1) the opening, (2) the complication, (3) the climax, and (4) the resolution" (p. 324-325). In the opening stage, a speaker sets a scene for acting, and the complication stage provides "difficulty, conflict or problem to arouse interest and develop the drama" (p. 325). For the climax stage, the authors suggest that "although you may hint at the eventual outcome, one way to maintain the attention of your listeners is to add the element of suspense as you reach your climax" (p. 325). In the resolution stage, the speaker concludes the story by "[tying] up the loose ends to provide a satisfying ending" (p. 325). In short, the four-part structure of *ki-shoo-ten-ketsu* is the structure of storytelling, which makes a speech into a drama. (See Figure 3.)

Supporting Materials

The next characteristic of Japanese rhetoric is that speakers employ personal experiences to not just illustrate an idea, but to make them the basis of their claims. Edward C. Stewart (1985) states:

> North Americans generally exhibit a specialized and strong attitude toward rationality, assuming that facts are the sole basis for decision-making for them and everyone else. Yet Japanese epistemology (knowing about knowing) is radical empiricism, whereas North Americans is logical realism. (p. 193)

Stewart points out that the term "experience" means different things in American and Japanese communication. For American speakers, experience includes information, data, or facts. However, Japanese speakers use this term for "a general category that includes information facts, opinions, impressions, images, statistics, or any other representation of human experience" (p. 192).

Furthermore, studies suggest that Japanese speakers emphasize personal experiences rather than factual evidence. In 1974, Yoko Yamada studied how Japanese people present their opinions in a reader's column of a newspaper. She pointed out that "most of the writers pick up one happening or their own experience, and then find some relationship with what they have heard before or what they have thought about society in general" (p. 155). Yamada explained that the Japanese share their personal experiences when discussing social issues whereas Americans present factual evidence to argue about social problems. Today, this tendency is still true in the writings of Japanese journalists. For example, the collected essays of professional writers in a text for Japanese learning (Sunakawa & Sunakawa, 1992) show the same feature Yamada suggested more than twenty years earlier. Makino & Nagano (1998) analyzed university students' speeches on "TV's Influence on Society." According to their report, 22% of the twenty-three freshmen of Shizuoka University, one of the national universities in Japan, presented factual evidence to support his or her claim(s); 13% used common experiences; and 56% of the students shared their personal experiences.

It should be noted that the way Japanese speakers present their experiences is also different from the way Americans generally present personal stories. Japanese speakers do not simply *tell* what happened but symbolically *show* how it happened. This is a reflection of what Edward T. Hall (1976) calls "high-context communication," in which "very little [information] is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message" (p. 79). Most scholars agree that the Japanese strongly rely on high-context communication. Dean C. Barnlund (1989) explains that Japanese people use symbols instead of verbal codes for message-exchanging. He states:

> Objects serve as instruments of communication. . . . It occurs when two people wish to comment on their relationship or their lives, but instead of discussing their feelings in so many words do so through some external object or action: The tea ceremony (*cha-no-yu*), flower arrangements (*ikebana*), writing of poetry (*haiku*), and calligraphic representation (*shodo*) all become vehicles for revealing one's thoughts as powerfully, but less explicitly, than through verbalization. (p. 128)

Barnlund argues that although such expressions also exist in Western cultures, they do not play as significant a role as verbal expressions for message-exchanging (p. 128). In contrast, Japanese people prefer such symbolic communication rather than explicit verbal communication. Symbolic message-exchanging is not only evident in personal interactions but also in public presentations.

Relationship between the Speaker and the Audience

The last characteristic of Japanese rhetoric explains why Japanese speakers organize a speech with the four-part structure, and why they emphasize symbolic representation of personal experiences; that is, Japanese speakers are not to confront their opponents but to share empathy with their listeners. The four-part structure and symbolic representation of personal experiences work effectively in empathy-establishment, which is the ultimate goal of Japanese speakers. According to Roichi Okabe (1983):

American rhetoric . . . is basically argumentative and logical in nature. It is also confrontational in that the speaker as an independent agent always stands face to face with the listener as another independent agent . . . . The Japanese, on the other hand, value harmony and view harmony-establishing and/or harmony-maintaining as a dominant function of communication. (pp. 37-38)

In American society, Stewart explains, every individual has the right to freely express his or her opinion in decision-making processes. In Japanese society, by contrast, decisions are "reached by a system that provides for a feeling around, a groping for someone, preferably the chair, to express the group's consensus" (p. 191). A moderator's role is not to facilitate each individual's free expression, but to predict the group's mind and to bring it together through empathy. Donald p. Cushman and Sarah Sanderson King (1985) suggest that "in Japan the chief value governing interorganizational conflict is the desire to overcome individual differences . . . [, and] empathy serves a crucial role for the Japanese in resolving conflict" (p. 127). On the contrary, in the United States, "the chief values governing interorganizational conflict are equality of opportunity, individual rights, competition, and individual achievement" (p. 128). In sum, Japanese rhetoric is crucially different from American rhetoric in terms of the relationship between the speaker and the audience. Japanese speakers aim to reach an agreement through empathy-establishment, whereas American speakers aim to reach an agreement through confrontation.

In order to establish empathy, a speech that symbolically represents personal experiences in the four-part structure is very effective because it produces strong psychological effects on the audience. Studies suggest such effects of symbolic expressions in drama. William G. Kirkwood (1991) states that "narrative theorists have long noted that writers can 'tell' readers what a character's performance means, or they can employ various narrative devices to 'show' what it means" (p. 40). He explains that "telling" provides commentary of an event, while "showing" presents narrative details. Many Western scholars consider "telling" to be superior to "showing" because "telling" can communicate messages more explicitly. Speakers choose to"tell" what the actions of characters mean to avoid misinterpretation by the listeners. However, Kirkwood claims that although "telling" may be more reliable for explicit message transmission, "'showing' can accomplish something that 'telling' cannot" (p. 43). He suggests that narrative details effectively disclose the psychology of the characters in a story. "Showing" allows the audience members to experience a character's state of mind. He states:

> The performance which reveals [a character's state of mind] may be invented, but the state of mind exists in the minds of the audience. It is as real as any of their own states of awareness, for it is their own awareness– not the character's (who is, after all, a linguistic construction). When people behold a state of mind in a narrated performance, they participate in it briefly. To witness what [a character] did is not the same as doing it oneself, but to behold his [or her] state of mind is to experience it for a moment. (p. 43)

When a symbolic recreation of a personal experience is presented, the audience members share the feelings of a character in the story as if they are in his or her position. "Showing" makes the event in a story more personal to the listeners, and removes the distance between the speaker and the audience. Japanese speeches produce such a psychological effect of "showing," and lead the members of the audience to feel empathy.

According to Ernest G. Bormann (1972), scholars have discovered that the members of a group construct a story when they become excited and emotionally involved in a conversation. The excitement and emotional involvement release the members from their self-consciousness, and each member plays a role in constructing a drama. What takes place in this dramatic situation refers to what happened or will happen somewhere else. The space and time is transferred from the "here-and-now" to the "there-and-then." Bormann suggests that this "recollection of something that happened to the group in the past or a dream of what the group might do in the future" is a fantasy theme (p. 397). The fantasy theme "pull[s the members] into participation" (p. 397), and they become emotionally involved. The shared feelings then "chain out" through the members of the group. This "chaining out," suggests Bormann, occurs not only in small groups but also in public groups, namely, a speaker and his or her audience. He claims that just as the members of a small group become linked through a fantasy theme, a speaker and the members of the audience become linked through a rhetorical vision–"the composite dramas which catch up large groups of people in a symbolic reality" (p. 398). A speaker collects the fantasy themes, which the audience members share, and creates a rhetorical vision. This process of "dramatizing" pulls the audience members into the symbolic event in a drama and ties them up. Again, such psychological effect of "dramatizing" leads audience members to feel empathy.

Over all, the features of Japanese rhetoric in comparison with American rhetoric is summarized in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Differences between Japanese and American Rhetoric

As described above, Japanese rhetoric is different from American rhetoric in terms of the relationship between the speaker and the audience, message conveyance, speech construction, speech development, and supporting material. However, the point I wish to make here is that in spite of these differences, we find both the "elements of a unit of proof" and inductive/deductive reasoning in Japanese rhetoric as well, except that it excludes *rebuttal* or *refutation*.

Examples of Japanese Speech

The following are two examples of a Japanese speech which presents the characteristics of Japanese rhetoric, and yet includes Toulmin's elements and Aristotelian reasoning.

A Speech by A Japanese Business Person

Background: One day, an office supervisor began a new practice on his floor. The practice required the fifty workers to take turns presenting a speech in front of his or her colleagues. Although the supervisor was soon transferred to another department, this custom of speech making remained on the floor. Everyone became tired of this everyday-after-lunch-break speech, but no one suggested doing anything about it until one speaker presented the following speech:

[Set-up] The other day, I attended my sister's wedding. I've been to quite a few weddings, and the ceremony of her wedding went just like every other wedding I've seen. You know how a typical wedding ceremony goes.

[Development] As I was watching her and her husband exercise all the rituals of the ceremony, I was wondering, "Do they understand why they have to hold the special cup in a certain way and drink sake three times in a row?" Or, "Do they really understand what the priest is saying when he repeats the ancient prayer?" Probably, they were exercising what they were supposed to do without even questioning what the rituals really mean.

[Transition] I was once a committee member of my church. One problem we used to have was that many people went home right after service, and so the congregation never really fellowship. The committee discussed the matter and decided to serve curry-and-rice after service every Sunday. When people ate curry-and-rice, they enjoyed talking to each other and stayed for a while to spend some time with other people. However, after a year or so, people still ate with the same people and did not bother to talk with new people. They ate curry-and-rice as it was served and had a few conversations with their regular friends, but as soon as they were done eating, they all went home.

[Connection] Whether it is the wedding rituals or a church activity, there must have been a reason why the custom was started. As time passes, however, people come to forget the original meaning, but still keep the formal practice. People tend to preserve the form well, but not the content. Aren't our daily speeches becoming like that?

Afterward: A week after this speech was presented, the managers of the floor decided to improve the activity. All the workers were divided into small groups and the speeches were put into practice.

In this oral presentation, the speaker *claims* (with *qualifier*) that the original purpose of the speech activity should be restored. The *warrant* of this *claim* is the *generalization* that the intentions of activities or practices tend to be forgotten as time passes. The evidence supporting this *warrant* is the speaker's *specific* experiences at a wedding and at church. These symbols of human life are not necessarily factual evidence, but they function as evidence from which the *warrant* is inductively drawn. This type of reasoning is what scholars call "reasoning by example"–a kind of inductive reasoning.

Besides this type of reasoning, Japanese speakers often use another kind of inductive reasoning. Speakers employ one personal experience or hypothetical story to suggest a generalization. The following is an example of this type of reasoning in a speech by a Japanese pastor on a radio program.

<u>A Speech by A Japanese Pastor</u>

[Opening]

Once upon a time, there were a farmer and his son who lived on top of a hill. They were engaged in reclaiming the entire hill. The farmer and his son would spend the whole day, everyday, digging out stones on the land.

[Complication]

One day, the farmer decided to work on one side of the hill, while his son worked on the other side. As usual, each of them spent the whole day working and finished the work at sunset.

On the way home, the farmer noticed something different in his son. So the farmer asked, "What's the matter, son?" The son replied, "Dad, today I found this huge stone on the land. The stone was so heavy that I couldn't even move it. I used the shovel, the spade, and even tried to lever the stone; I tried everything I could think of, but I just couldn't get it out!"

[Climax]

Then, the farmer said (in a sad voice), "Son, you said that you tried everything you could think of, but there was one thing you didn't try."

"What is that?" the son asked.

"You didn't ask me to help you." said the farmer gently.

[Resolution]

Aren't we often like this little son when we are before God, our Father?

In this oral presentation, the speaker *claims* (with *qualifier*) that instead of assuming people can do everything on their own, they should humble themselves and ask God for help when they are distressed. The *warrant* of this *claim* is the *generalization* of human's innate tendency for autonomy and accountability. The *evidence* supporting this *warrant* is a *specific* experience of a farmer and his son. This story is merely a symbol of human life and is not scientific at all, but it functions as *evidence* from which the *warrant* is *inductively* drawn. This type of reasoning is what scholars call "reasoning by analogy"–another kind of inductive reasoning.

Though the examples above are concisely presented, longer speeches by Japanese speakers are usually filled with more symbolic expressions. These symbols also function as *signs* of deductive reasoning. For example, if I said, "Most of the students were yawning throughout the class," the listeners would know that the class was boring without my mentioning it. No one would argue that it was the *sign* of students' being excited. This is because we all agree on the *generalization* that people yawn when they are bored. Symbolic expressions in oral presentations function as *signs* which *deductively* draw a *generalization* behind it. This type of reasoning is what scholars call "reasoning by sign"–a kind of deductive reasoning. After all, high-context communication itself is a kind of "reasoning by sign." People are able to transfer messages in symbolic expressions because these symbols stand on the basis of information that people all agree on. In high-context communication, there is always a generalization behind each symbolic expression.

On the whole, the mechanism of configural logic is illustrated in Figure 5. In comparison to linear logic (refer to Figure 2), the differences are obvious. The speaker's goal is to establish empathy with the audience, not to confront it; the evidence are symbols, not factual evidence; a central point and small ideas, not the main points laid out in order, support the claim of the speaker; the thesis and the conclusion are only implied, and not clearly stated; and the speech develops dramatically from a four-part structure, not rationally from a three-part structure.

Figure 5. Mechanism of Configural Logic

Transcultural Speechmaking Principles

Although differences do exist between linear logic and configural logic, we also find common features between the two logic systems. In regards to Figure 2 and Figure 5, both linear logic and configural logic include the indispensable elements of a unit of proof (claim, warrant, and evidence). A claim is presented with qualifier, and the evidence logically supports the warrant in both logic systems.

Figure 6. Transcultural Speechmaking Principles

A speaker's claim, or how these elements compose a speech, might not be as visible in configural logic as they are in linear logic. This is because a parabolic implication is often more effective for empathy-establishment than a clear, straightforward statement is. Each element seems to function differently because they aim to accomplish different goals. However, both linear logic and configural logic share the mutual framework: **a speaker's *claim* (with *qualifier*) has to be based on the *warrant* which is logically (*inductively* and/or *deductively*) supported by the *evidence*; and how each of these elements should function depends on the relationship between the speaker and the audience in a particular speaking situation.** (See Figure 6.)

Conclusion

It is true that Western traditions have developed linear logic, and Eastern traditions have developed configural logic. However, this does not necessarily mean that linear logic is the best method for Westerners, nor that configural logic is the prime method for Easterners. Contemporary societies are driven to find transcultural speechmaking principles as cultural pluralism becomes more dominant. While the Japanese government seeks to foster linear rationality in their society so that Japanese people are able to communicate more effectively in intercultural arenas, American society is experiencing the Post-Modern age in which people no longer seek linear rationality but emotion and experience.

Furthermore, scholars such as Pierre Babin (1991) and W. Lance Haynes (1990) suggest that contemporary people, who have grown up with audio-visual technologies, no longer communicate like their counterparts did during the age of the printing press. Babin suggests that people of modern day communicate through emotional experiences by means of imagination or symbol, instead of intellectually understanding ideas or theories. Haynes claims that contemporary speakers, in order to communicate a message with their audiences who live in this electronic era, should establish existential relationships with their audiences by sharing the same physical and emotional spaces.

One reflection of such enormous movement is how many Western scholars now pay more attention to the effect of storytelling, especially since Walter Fisher presented his narrative paradigm in 1987. Some recent university textbooks in the United States, which explicitly present their attention to narrative, include Kearney and Plax's *Public speaking in a diverse society* (1996), Michael Osborn and Suzanne Osborn's *Public speaking* (3rd ed.) (1994), Thomas A. Hollihan and Kevin T. Baaske's Argumentation and arguing: The products and process of human decision making (1994), and George W. Ziegelmueller and Jack Kay's *Argumentation: Inquiry & advocacy* (3rd ed.) (1997).

Some American scholars and teachers–though the number is still small–are sensitive with the need of pedagogical improvement in speech education. Robert Powell (1992) claims that although current classrooms of public speaking consist of individuals who have a variety of cultural backgrounds, the traditional speech pedagogy is dominant. Since most teachers ignore or deny the importance of individuals' cultural identities, students who do not have the mainstream background are at a disadvantage. In most public speaking courses, all students are measured against their ability to enact the model speech with linear logic. Students from minority groups, therefore, do not have equal opportunity to succeed. These students either adopt the dominant philosophy and abandon their cultural identities, or they retain their identities and exclude themselves from the educational mainstream (pp. 344-345). J. Jeffrey Auer (1989) suggests that one major contemporary issue with which the community of speech education must deal with is to try "teaching for acceptance and understanding of the cultural pluralism that underlies the ongoing globalization of national business, finance and technology, and of regional language and cultures" (p. 63). Professor Kenneth R. Chase at Wheaton College, in his constant attempt to improve his public speaking curriculum, actually uses Figure 3. as a visual aid for understanding the concept of configural logic. He also introduces to his students, "A Speech by A Japanese Business Person" to illustrate how the Japanese structure works out in practice.

Both American and Japanese societies are seeking how to best introduce non-traditional methodology and to integrate it with traditional principles. Probably, the most important step to take is to abandon the assumption that audiences' cultural backgrounds determine the most effective logic system. Kearney and Plax state "research indicates that audience members can make sense out of a wide variety of organizational patterns, regardless of their cultural affiliations" (p.239).

The effectiveness of linear logic, or configural logic, does not always depend on which cultural groups the audience belongs to, but where the audience stands in relationship with the speaker. For example, in speaking situations such as business meetings, committee discussions, and presentations at conventions, some audience members are likely to confront the speaker. In such cases, powerful claims are those arguments which are based on rational warrants supported by evidence that has disproved all opposing ideas. However, there are also other kinds of speaking situations, such as graduation commencements, funeral services, and the sharing of personal testimonies, where speeches that establish empathy might be more influential than speeches that confront the audience. Symbolic representations of human experiences in drama allow the speaker and the audience to share the same feelings, spaces, and perspectives, whereas linear logic only creates a gap between the two sides.

Of course, one can neither draw a definite line between various kinds of audiences nor determine the most effective logic system for these audiences. In many cases, rather, the relationship between the speaker and the audience includes the elements of both confrontation and empathy-establishment. What I would like to suggest is, because audiences in modern society vary in the kinds of speaking situations, speakers ought to be flexible in their choices of logic system. They need to be skillful and creative in their selection, or they may choose to integrate the two different logic systems into one speech. The most persuasive speakers in today's world are those who can make effective use of both linear and configural logics, regardless of the cultural backgrounds of the speaker and the audience.

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