Television and Enculturation Among Korean Adolescents: Cultivation Analysis

Jong Geun Kang

Illinois State University

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to describe some possible elaborations of the cultivation hypothesis and present relevant evidence from a Korean student sample. The central hypothesis of this study is that greater television viewing is associated with Korean students' attitudes in terms of sex roles, the family system and social values.

Using the postulates and methodology of the cultivation analysis approach to mass communication, this study employs a two-pronged research strategy: message system analysis and cultivation analysis. Message system analysis began by collecting a one-week sample of television programs from the three Korean television networks. The sample includes all programming on all three networks aired during one week of prime time in March 1987. For cultivation analysis, a questionnaire was administered to 1,169 students attending four junior and senior high schools in two different suburb areas of Seoul, Korea.

Within the clear limitations of measures, the findings indicate that the heavy Korean television viewing is related to traditional sex roles and to a distorted social reality on social values.

Introduction

Although some critics say that television has lost its magic and most people simply regard it as furniture, it still offers fun, excitement, imagination, and has known a fascinating medium for the mass audience. Television has become a substitute for the mother, a real baby sitter for many young children, a companion for adolescents, and an entertainment medium for adults in any culture.

As George Gerbner and his colleagues put it, "our children are born into a home in which--for the first time in human history--not the parents, church, or school but a centralized commercial institution tells most of the stories most of the time" (Gerbner *et al*.

1986a, 1). If this is true, television may "cultivate from infancy the very predispositions and preferences that used to be acquired from other primary sources" (Gerbner *et al*. 1986b, 18).

Since television sets have become common household items, many studies have centered on aspects of social reality related to the content of television. Children and teenagers particularly seem to be the subjects of increasing concentration in studies involving television's influence. In the U.S., the average amount of time spent viewing by half of all American adolescents on a given day is three hours or more (Lowery and DeFleur 1983). They tend to watch more television than do adults, prefer to watch adult programs, and usually watch as late into the night as do adults. Obviously, teenagers spend many hours in front of the television set.

It has been commonly agreed that television has become the source of the most broadly shared images and messages in history (Gerbner *et al.* 1986b). Television's symbolic impacts in shaping or directing viewer's perceptions and behaviors toward others and society have been widely researched and documented in the U.S. as well as other countries.

Cultivation analysis tries to assess television's contribution to viewers' beliefs, behaviors, and values based on the delineation of the central and critical facts of life in the world of television (Gross and Morgan 1985). Although cultivation analysis has been criticized for its lack of the theoretical and methodological foundations (Newcomb 1978; Wober 1978; Hughes 1980; Hirsch 1980 & 1981), it has enjoyed increased scientific and public interest in the United States. In particular, it has stimulated European research in many ways, such as in the long-term effects of cultural indicator research.

The first European cultural indicators project was introduced by Karl Erik Rosengren in Sweden in the middle 1970's. After Cultural Indicators of the Swedish Symbol System (CISSS) project led by Rosengren, other replication studies were done mostly in Western Europe (the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden, Great Britain, and elsewhere) and in Australia.

Although some replications of international cultivation analysis confirm Gerbner *et al.*'s findings, there is considerable disagreement about cultivation analysis in other countries. In this sense, international cultivation analysis faces "the formidable challenges of any cross-cultural comparative research effort (Morgan 1990, 228).

Hedinsson and Windahl (1984) explored some cultivation patterns within two waves of 5th and 9th graders (11-15 years of age) among about 1,000 Swedish adolescents. The findings revealed some consistent correlations between respondents' conceptions of social reality and the amount of television viewing. Similar findings were reported by Pingree and Hawkins (1981), Weimann (1984), Tan *et al*. (1987), among others.

Bouwman (1984) conducted telephone interviews with 607 Dutch respondents, and examined the relationships between perceptions of violence and television viewing.

However, he found little support for cultivation analysis in the Netherlands. In an effort to replicate cultivation, his analysis emphasized not only the linear cultivation effect, but also the "mainstreaming" and "resonance" patterns within subgroups. In each case, the relationships were weak and non-systematic. Similar studies done in England (Piepe, Crouch, & Emerson 1977; Wober 1978) and Canada (Doob and Macdonald 1979) also failed to support cultivation.

Despite some of the contradictory findings, some researchers acknowledge that there is probably something to Gerbner's idea that television viewing cultivates distorted perceptions of reality (Jeffres 1986). Others argue that replication of cultivation analysis in other cultural settings is problematic due to their differing economic, political, and social systems (Bouwman and Stappers 1984).

Although the number of studies on international cultivation analysis applied to various areas has increased in recent years, very little empirical research has been done to examine the cross-cultural effects between television viewing and television-biased culture. Unfortunately, little attention has been paid to cultivation analysis in different cultural backgrounds, such as in Asian and African countries.

The present study will test the cultivation hypothesis in one Asian country, Korea, a country that is very much unlike the U.S. in its traditions, history, morality, and values. The purpose of this study is to describe some possible elaborations of the cultivation hypothesis and present relevant evidence from a Korean student sample. This study also attempts to measure the pervasiveness of "cultural outlook" in Korean television programming. The pervasiveness of "cultural outlook" is based on the cultural aspects--westernized or traditional--depicted on all three Korean networks' programming, such as sex roles, the family system, and social values. Then, the television message data are compared with cultivation data to examine the possible cultivation effects on a Korean student sample.

Traditional Korean Culture and Television

Korea has a rich history built on thousands of years of deeply held cultural bonds and values (Robinson 1986). Traditional Korean culture is founded on an odd mixture of Confucianism and Buddhism. As a philosophy of humanity, Confucianism is most elaborate in explicating proper human relationships. Confucianism defines an almost religious adherence to a set of social conventions: father-love, son-filiality; husband-initiative, wife-obedience; elder brother-brotherly love, younger brother-reverence; and friends-mutual faith (Yum 1985). The influence of Confucianism on Korean thought and behavior has been immense, but it has been filtered by other influences to the point that

> it is difficult to tell what in Korean life is truly Confucian and what is not. People do not usually think of themselves as Confucians, though the natural Korean

> way to do things is largely the Confucian way. This is reflected in the hierarchy of social relations, in the respect felt toward the elderly, in the desire for education, in ceremonies to commemorate the deceased, and in the continuing influence of the extended family, even though increasingly --at least in the city-- the living unit is a nuclear family. Filial piety and patriotism are cardinal virtues taught all children. (*Facts about Korea* 1981, l58).

Buddhism, on the other hand, teaches that all things, all people are part of one great whole and that reality is only a construction in the mind of man for existence in his physical state. It calls for spontaneity of action, so that what one does corresponds as closely as possible to the way of the world. How these two concepts blend is one of the greatest mysteries to the Westerner who attempts to understand Korean traditional culture (Robinson 1986).

It is true that Korea is in a state of mixed perspectives: Traditional culture has been retained but lifestyles have changed. The thought patterns of the Korean fall somewhere between Confucian social tradition and the desires and perspectives of present-day urban man (Robinson 1986). According to the Korean Overseas Information Service:

> Korea is a country blending change and tradition. In both the city and the countryside the appearance of Korea is changing with great speed but beneath this transformation of society is a stability born of centuries-old traditions and customs which while modified to fit a new society still have great meaning and a powerful influence (*Facts about Korea* 1981, 158).

It is questionable how much tradition is changing in Korea or in what direction the society is progressing. But some traditional values and behavioral norms are still prevalent in Korea. For example, Korean television promotes a certain set of cultural values and norms in the audience by producing what are perceived as quality programs, imbued with Korea's cultural identity and national aspirations (Lee 1982). This means that the content of television should go with the Korean moral and ethical standard. Accordingly, Korean television appears more restrictive than American television in depicting dating, marriage, violence, sex, etc. For example, no kissing, love affairs, partial nudity, or brutally violent scenes are allowed to be broadcast on Korean television networks (Kang 1989). Furthermore, any unethical and religious themes which are against Korean moral standards are not allowed.

Television in Korea has become the favored medium and television watching the favorite national pastime with the mass audience. There were only 38,000 television sets used in Korea in 1970, but the distribution of sets climbed to an estimated 6.27 million in 1980 (Lee 1982). As of 1987, Koreans owned close to 8 million television sets, a penetration rate of 97.5 percent.

The Republic of Korea has 54 television stations. Of these, 27 are connected to the government-owned Korean Broadcasting System networks (KBS-TV1, KBS-TV2), and 21 are affiliates of the Munhwa Broadcasting Company (MBC-TV), which is owned by the Foundation of Broadcast Culture. The remaining six stations are part of the American Forces Korean Television Network (AFKN-TV), which is run by the U.S. military.

In the early period, Korean television networks were heavily dependent on foreign imports in their programming. Most of them came from the U.S. Overall, imported programs averaged approximately one-third of total programing hours in 1969 (Lee 1982). In recent years, the Korean television networks have decreased imported programming hours from 16 percent in 1983 to 11.7 percent in 1987. In the 85.5 hours weekly program schedule as of March 1987, MBC-TV presented 15.1 hours of American programs, compared to 11 hours of KBS-TV2 and 4.1 hours of KBS-TV1. These were programs such as "A Team," "Airwolf," "MacGyver," "Knight Rider," "Weekend American Movies" and cartoons.

Method

This study is designed to determine whether relationships between television viewing and social reality beliefs truly exist within a Korean sample. Using the postulates and methodology of the cultivation analysis approach to mass communication, this study employs a two-pronged research strategy: message system analysis and cultivation analysis.

Message system analysis began by selecting a week-long sample of Korean prime-time (7-10 p.m.) network dramatic programming broadcast nationally during a one week period of March 1987. The sample of three Korean networks' programming was videotaped and coded by two trained observers who made detailed, objective records about different aspects of program content. Weekend-daytime programs were excluded in this study because most of them were rebroadcasting or sports programs.

The measure is based on cultural aspects, mainly by westernized and traditional aspects, on all three network's programming. Cultural outlook is defined as a cluster of symbols standing for ideas, beliefs, and values in any context on Korean television programming. Accordingly, the cultural outlook data include some traditional and westernized culture and values on Korean television programs, such as sex roles, family, and social values. For example, aspects of cultural outlook on Korean television programs are coded according to the emphasis and tendency of their presentations in the sample.[1]

The data were subjected to an exhaustive reliability analysis to insure that the observations reflect the properties of the material under investigation rather than instrument ambiguity or observer bias. A total of 37 prime-time dramatic programs were coded by two coders who had been trained in the coding scheme.[2] The percentage of

agreement (or coefficient of reliability) for the program analysis and the character analysis reached 87.2% and 83.7% respectively.[3]

To provide more information on the Korean television world, message system analysis examined some aspects projected in the Korean television world. In this message system analysis, special attention was paid to the presentation of the following variables: family size, dwelling, setting, dining, drink, food, music, clothes, and dating behavior in the prime-time dramatic programs. The method used in this analysis included measures of how often these variables appear within the sample. Coding categories were five-point scales, from "Western" to "Traditional" with "Even" as the midpoint.

For cultivation analysis, a questionnaire was administered to 1,169 Korean students (588 eighth graders and 581 eleventh graders) attending four junior and senior high schools in two different suburb areas of Seoul, Korea. A total of 1,169 self-administered questionnaires, written in Korean, were given in October 1987 to Korean students. The questionnaire was lengthy and contained items assessing a variety of opinions, knowledge, and media beliefs and habits. The survey was conducted in classes over a two-week period. Instructors (teachers) were provided full instructions by the author to answer any possible questions raised by respondents.

Findings

Message System Analysis. Sixty-five percent of the 340 families in the Korean prime-time dramatic programs are composed of large or extended families (see Figure 1 on the next page). Among them, 36.9 percent live with elderly people in traditional Confucian style. By contrast, 28.6 percent of the families in the sample live in nuclear families.

Nearly 70 percent of 489 houses in the Korean dramatic television programs are Korean style houses. Although many characters live in Western-style houses or apartments, many urban houses and almost all of those in the countryside in the Korean dramatic program embody the traditional style, which is characterized as one-story, age-old radiant heating system, all-purpose room, and walls of brick or cement building blocks.

Traditional settings in the house are prevalent in the world of Korean television. About 70 percent of them still show the Korean futon, small

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Figure 1: Cultural Outlook on the Korean Dramatic Television Programs

dining table, and traditional furniture. The most distinctive aspect of settings in the house is that Western style settings of kitchen, living room, and bed room appear mostly in nuclear families who live in modern apartments.

Westernized food life, however, is prevalent in the Korean dramatic programs. Nearly 86 percent of the characters go to Western restaurants when they dine out. Close to 75 percent of them drink Western beverages, and 55.2 percent of them eat Western style food for their meals. Western music is especially prevalent in the Korean prime-time dramatic programs. Close to 90 percent of all music played by characters or used as background music in the programs are Western pop music.

About 90 percent of all 722 dramatic characters wear Western clothing. Male characters seldom wear traditional clothing except in historical drama. But old female characters wear both traditional and Western clothing depending on convenience and the occasion. As one might expect, young people never wear traditional clothing, even for special occasions such as Sul Nal (the Lunar New Year's Day) and Chu Sok (the Korean equivalent of Thanksgiving Day).

Most characters who are dating show very liberal attitudes towards marriage and courtship. Among 49 dating couples, 83.7 percent of them appear to talk freely about their marriages. They seem to regard marriage as their own concerns, not as a concern of parents or elder members of their families. In Korean tradition, a marriage is usually arranged through a match-maker, who makes arrangements for various preliminary matters between the two families. But only 17.5 percent of them seem to follow this tradition in the Korean prime-time dramatic programs.

Some aspects of traditional sex roles, however, are still prevalent. For example, women are underrepresented in the world of Korean dramatic television. Most of them have low-income occupations, whereas men are mostly cast in the high-income and important occupations. Among 101 married couples, 73 percent of them show unequal status between husbands and wives. Husbands seem to have higher status than their wives. For example, husbands usually use address terms to their wives which elevate their own position, while wives position themselves down through their use of address terms. Nearly 71 percent of wives pick one-up terms to address their husband, while 68 percent of husbands use one-down terms for wives. No wives address their husbands by first names in the world of Korean prime-time dramatic television .

Traditional husband-wife relationships are always recommended in the world of Korean television drama, where 98 percent of the husbands are the main income providers, 86 percent of the husbands hold the leading position, and only a few of the

husbands participate in domestic affairs. Furthermore, among 397 male characters, none does any household chores like cooking, cleaning the house, and washing dishes, whereas over 90 percent of housewives in the world of Korean dramatic programs do household chores. This disparity clearly shows the superior status of husbands and subordinate status of wives in the television dramatic programs.

Historically, the concept of equality between sexes is an individualistic notion which has no deep root in Korea. Although woman's social and political status has improved considerably in recent years, the age-old tradition of male supremacy could not be extirpated overnight. Korean mass media openly instill the notion of inequality between sexes by insisting upon highly conventionalized role differentiation. As far as gender-roles and women's status are concerned, Korean television drama seems to reinforce traditional values, beliefs, and behavior.

Cultivation Analysis. The sample is 50.2 percent male and 49.8 percent female, 50.3 percent eighth graders and 49.7 percent eleventh graders, and 58.7 percent of the students' fathers and 30.5 percent of their mothers attended at least some college. Respondents are aged from 13 to 18 (the mean age is 15.8 years, SD=1.58). The sample is upper-middle class, but shows a good deal of socioeconomic diversity. In terms of religion, 44 percent are "Christians," 11 percent are ''Buddhists," and 45 percent indicate they do not affiliate themselves with any specific religion.

Exposure to Korean television programs was measured with the open-ended question, "On an average day, how many hours do you spend watching television?" By American standards, exposure to Korean television is relatively low. Thirty percent reported spending over two hours viewing television "on an average day." Respondents were trichotomized into light (less than one hour, 30%), medium (one hour to two hours, 40%), and heavy viewers (over two hours, 30%).

The dependent measures are derived from a total of 9 items which deal mainly with respondents' attitudes toward family, dating, marriage, divorce, food, and on their perceptions about traditional and Western societal characteristics in terms of gender-roles, values, and culture. Conceptually and empirically, these 9 items were reduced to three indices of "sex roles," "family," and "social values." Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on each set, and in each case only a single factor with an eigenvalue of more than 1.0 was found. The dimensions tapped by the indices are as follows:

Sex roles: Three variables measuring students' orientations toward traditional sex roles in terms of reinforcing the traditional husband's role, wife's role, and married women's social participation (Eigenvalue 1.61 and Total Variance 54%).

Family: Three variables measuring students' orientations toward the traditional family system in Korea. The items concern unrestricted dating, the importance of

discussing marriage with parents, and attitudes toward love marriage (Eigenvalue 1.3 and Total Variance 43.3%).

Social Values: Three variables designed to measure students' orientations toward social values. The items concern drinking, divorce rate, and female smoking (Eigenvalue 1.35 and Total Variance 45%).

Response categories for "sex roles" and "family" were five-point Likert scales, from 'strongly agree' to 'strongly disagree' with 'no opinion' as the midpoint.

Of the various demographic variables considered, Pearson Correlations reveal highly significant relationships between television viewing and grade ($r=-.37$, $p<.001$), age ($r=-.32$, $p<.001$), father's education ($r=-.21$, $p<.00l$), mother's education ($r=-.18$, $p<.001$), income ($r=-.27$, $p<.001$), and family size ($r=-.18$, $p<.05$). Eighth graders (2.22 hours per day), younger students (1.97), those with less educated parents (2.35), low incomes (2.21), those who have small families (1.52), and those who have no religious affiliation (2.01) are more likely to be heavy viewers. On the contrary, eleventh graders (.78), older students (.81), those with educated parents (1.01), high incomes (1.02), those who have large families (1.05), and those who have religious affiliation (1.52) tend to view less.

For further analysis, television viewing was compared with respondents' school performance, IQ scores, and homework hours. Overall, the simple correlations show negative correlations between television viewing and school performance ($r= -.09$, $p<.001$), IQ scores ($r= -.09$, $p<.05$), and homework hours ($r= -.18$, $p<.001$). When controlling for sex, grade, and parents' education, it still remains negative in most cases.

Sex roles: Knowing that Korea is experiencing the cultural transformation from a more traditional to a predominantly westernized nation, the sex-role attitudinal measure was designed to reflect possible tensions between Western and traditional Korean values with emphasis on women's role in the family (see Table 1 on pages 76-7). Specifically, it attempts to measure whether television viewing is associated with respondents' perspectives on gender-role and women's status.

Overall, television viewing is negatively related to "sex roles" in most cases when controlling for various demographic variables, such as sex, grade, religion, and school performance. As shown in Table 1, those who watch more television are less likely to express liberal values on gender-roles and women's status. Interestingly, the relationships between the amount of television viewing and attitudes about sex roles tend to be stronger for females, despite the somewhat important finding that females are more traditional and conservative while males are more progressive and liberal. For females, greater television viewing goes with an intensely protective attitude toward traditional sex roles. In contrast, males who watch more television are likely to take more "liberal" positions on the sex-role attitudes.

In order to see whether there are any within-group variations in this pattern, partial correlations were run between television viewing and "sex roles" index within each sub-group, simultaneously controlling for all other relevant variables (data not shown). When within-group controls for demographics are implemented simultaneously, the relationships between television viewing and females are negative and significant ($r=-.17$, $p<.001$), whereas, for males, the relationships are very weak and not significant at all.

Family: "Family" index is designed to reflect possible tensions between Western and traditional values with emphasis on "marriage" and "dating."[5] Overall, heavy viewers are slightly more likely than light viewers to take liberal positions on marriage and dating in most cases. When controlling for key demographic variables, the resulting patterns become interesting. Males are more likely than their counterparts to take liberal positions on marriage and dating. It is interesting to note that eighth graders are more liberal than eleventh graders on "family," although both grades remain positive. Controlling for religion, however, reduces the relations to small and nonsignificant proportions. Christians and Buddhists show weak and monotonic associations with television viewing.

Overall, analysis of partial correlations controlling for various demographics reveals very weak positive associations between the amount of viewing and "family" in most cases (data not shown). However, there are very strong negative associations between "family" and television viewing for bad school performers, when controlled for sex and grade ($r=.-27$, $p<.05$). But when simultaneous controls are implemented, the correlations for religion, while negatively strong, disappear, but the relationships hold up for grade ($r=-.36$, $p<.05$) and sex ($r=.28$, $p<.05$).

Social Values: The "Social Values" index was designed to measure how television viewing is related to the respondents' conceptions of social reality, in terms of female smoking, wine drinking, and the divorce rate in Korea. The "social values" index questions were constructed with the same technique used by Gerbner *et al*. The underlying assumption is that, since Korean prime-time dramatic television programs frequently show wine drinkers, divorced people, and female smokers, respondents heavily engaged in television fare would overestimate them more often than those who are light viewers.

As Table 1 shows, strong positive relationships are observed in most cases. All groups except eleventh graders and bad school performers show positive, monotonic, and significant associations with television viewing. Females are more likely to give television answers than males. They are more likely than males to overestimate the number of female smokers, divorced people, and wine drinkers. Analysis of partial correlations modifies the above findings: Females who watch more television tend to be more likely to endorse the liberal perspective on "social values." The simple correlations between television viewing and "social values" for females are positive and moderately strong ($r=.15$, $p<.001$).

Other significant differences are observed in grade subgroups. As Table 1 indicates, younger students are more likely than older students to endorse television perspectives. Partial correlations reveal no associations, however, between

TABLE 1


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television viewing and "social values" for either eighth graders or eleventh graders. Thus, it seems that the associations between television viewing and "social values" are rendered spurious by grade. Analysis of partial correlations controlling for key demographic variables reveals positive associations between the amount of viewing and "social values" except for the bad school performer group. Overall, the simple r shows that there are moderately strong positive associations among Buddhists ($r=.18$, $p<.01$) and good school performers ($r=.18$, $p<.001$).

Discussion

Within the clear limitations of sample and measures, the results reported in this study offer some support for the cultivation hypothesis. Although the findings are not statistically enormous, they seem to indicate that heavy Korean television viewing is related to traditional views of sex roles: Those who watch more are more likely to endorse traditional perspectives on gender-roles and women's status. The findings suggest that television viewing has a minimal effect in generating Korean students' conceptions of liberalism in sex roles. However, we must note significant differences for males and females, not only in terms of how much they watch but also in the implications of their viewing. This may possibly be explained by examining the cultural context of Korean society.

In Korea, the dimension of sex roles revolves primarily around the traditional Confucian concept that a woman's position is subordinate to that of a man, both in the family and society. This phenomenon is clearly reflected in the world of Korean television. For example, women appear almost as frequently as do men, but they are generally shown in subordinate roles, both within the family and in the larger society. Given the fact that the male-female relationship is a product of a long-established Korean culture, whether or not the impact of television programs can surpass or transform the deep-rooted "social conceptions" in the minds of viewers is an interesting point of inquiry.

There is evidence that Korean television viewing is weakly related to liberal attitudes towards dating and marriage. This is congruent with the world of Korean television drama. For example, message system analysis data show that today's young generations do not desire to adhere blindly to the Confucian tradition concerning dating and marriage. Ironically, the way young Koreans do things is largely the Confucian way. This implies that they do not absorb Western culture unconditionally. Western culture might merely drift on the surface of traditional culture, failing to penetrate to its bottom and take root.

There is also evidence that heavy television viewing is positively related to a distorted image of "social values." The findings suggest that students who watch more television tend to overestimate the number of wine drinkers and female smokers, as well

as the divorce rate. The findings show a much greater tendency to endorse more television-biased responses in most cases. Thus, consistent exposure to Korean television drama may be one of the cultivating factors to their attitudinal changes about "social values."

This study explored some possible consequences of cultural transfer by investigating the contribution of television programs to Korean students' conceptions of social reality. Surely, television has long been assumed to play an important role as a transmitter of cultural values and attitudes. Given the importance of television as a cultural medium and a transmitter of cultural values, the probability exists that television viewing might have a major impact on Korean students' conceptions of social reality.

Although this study does not present strong evidence of cultivation among Korean students, several limitations should be noted. First, the findings, of course, are based on a cross-sectional survey, and inferences about causal relationships are subject to other interpretations. The hypothesized causal relationship between television viewing and cultivation can be tested more rigidly in longitudinal studies.

Second, the sample is drawn from the suburb of a large city region. Most respondents live in the suburbs. Perhaps, a study of those who live in rural areas might reveal somewhat different findings. The present analysis raises some questions: it did not consider the various geographic differences. Regional differences should be considered and tested in future analysis.

Third, this study examined the pervasiveness of "cultural outlook" in the Korean television program. The pervasiveness of "cultural outlook" was based on the cultural aspects depicted in the world of Korea dramatic programs. Given the premise that television presents a relatively coherent set of images and messages produced for a total population, the symbolic messages in any given culture can be taken to represent the values of that culture. The symbolic messages and images produced-by television in a given culture might reflect the country's media system and cultural diversity. Accordingly, the symbolic messages in television should be interpreted and processed in cultural contexts.

It seems reasonable to assume that, because television is such a far-reaching cultural force, television's symbolic message may reflect other cultural forms within the broader social context. In this sense, this study strongly attests to the importance of studying message system analysis in other countries, suggesting that the validity of cross-cultural comparisons should rest on dimensions of similarity and dissimilarity between media system, political system, and cultural identity. Thus, it would be a meaningless effort without appropriate investigations of the structural differences in the media system in given economic, social, cultural, and political backgrounds.

Finally, we should understand that the issue of the problems in international cultivation analysis is significant and critical, and that it needs to be elaborated in much

more detail, as well as at a much more explicit and comprehensive level. It seems clear that further international cultivation analysis, equipped with more deliberately designed approach, is urgent. This problem can possibly be solved through more cross-cultural studies in many countries. Further replications in more diverse cultures are desirable.

Notes

1. Coding is based on the following instrument: Recording instrument for the program: Tone of Program, Sentimentality, Place of Action, Date of Major Action, Setting of Major Action (Habitat), Culture (courtship/dating, religion, food, dress, dwelling, family size, marriage, address term, politics, economic system, music, and family), and Theme/Topic (humane, nature, science, crime, mass communications and entertainment, business, schools, religion, and intimate or close relationship). Recording instrument for the character cultural outlooks recording unit: sex, chronological age, social age, nationality of character, religious affiliation, socio-economic status, occupation, cohabitant, family, homemaker, parents, children, romantic involvement, role of character, character type, clothing, marriage, dwelling, setting, family, address-term, dating, food, drink, dining out, playing music, use of language, and use of product or device.

2. Weekend television viewing hours excluded in this study because most of weekend television programming in the three Korean networks included a heavy dose of variety shows, sitcoms, talk shows, rebroadcasting, and sports programs.

3. The following reliability formula was used:

$$\% = \frac{2M}{N1 + N2}$$

   where M is the number of coding decisions on which the two judges are in agreement and Nl and N2 refer to the number of coding decisions made by judges 1 and 2, respectively. See Ole R. Holsti, *Content Analysis For The Social Sciences And Humanities* (Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1969), 140.

4. Forty percent of their fathers' occupation are doing business (business merchants); 30 percent are employed (business employees); 10 percent are government & military employees; 5 percent are medical doctors, nurses, and scientists; 4 percent are educators; 3 percent are farmers; 3 percent are artists and entertainers; and 5 percent are unemployed.

5. As it is almost impossible to treat all the factors that can be covered by the "family" index, it was decided to focus on respondents' attitudes toward 'marriage,' because marriage is closely connected with family life. Traditionally, marriage arranged by a match-maker (go-between) is considered more ideal than love-marriage in which individual intentions become the deciding factor in Korea. However, this notion of marriage has been drastically changed since Western culture has influenced the traditional Korean culture. Accordingly, the young generation's view of marriage and dating seems to be strongly influenced by Western liberalism. Along this line, "family" index is designed to reflect possible tensions between Western and traditional values with emphasis on "marriage" and "dating."

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