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SoK: A Comprehensive Security Analysis of Jailbreak Resilience in GPT and DeepSeek Models †

Xiaodong Wu [1,‡], Xiangman Li [1,‡], Qi Li [1], Lingshuang Liu [2] and Jianbing Ni [1,*]

[1] Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Queen's University, Kingston, ON K7L 3N6, Canada
[2] Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada
* Correspondence: jianbing.ni@queensu.ca

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‡ These authors contributed equally to this work.

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Abstract: The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has brought increasing attention to their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks, where adversarial prompts are crafted to bypass safety mechanisms and induce harmful responses. While proprietary models such as GPT-4 have undergone extensive safety evaluations, the robustness of recently released open-source models, including the DeepSeek family, remains less well understood despite their rapid integration into real-world LLM applications. This paper presents a systematic evaluation of jailbreak robustness for the DeepSeek-R1 distilled model family, providing a standardized comparison with GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 using the HarmBench benchmark (v1.0). Our evaluation covers seven representative jailbreak strategies across 320 harmful behaviors from the HarmBench text test split, spanning both functional categories and semantic dimensions. The results show that DeepSeek exhibits certain resistance to automated attacks, particularly LLM-guided approaches such as TAP-T (Tree of Attacks with Pruning–Transfer), but remains more vulnerable to prompt-level and manually constructed adversarial attacks. In comparison, GPT-4 Turbo demonstrates stronger and more consistent safety alignment across diverse harmful behaviors, suggesting the benefit of more extensive safety optimization and reinforcement learning from human feedback. Beyond aggregate attack success rates, our behavioral analysis and case studies reveal that DeepSeek does not consistently enforce safety constraints under adversarial conditions, resulting in irregular refusal patterns across different attack settings. These findings expose a broader challenge in balancing model capability with alignment robustness and motivate the development of more targeted safety tuning techniques for reliable deployment of open-source LLMs.

Keywords: AI security; jailbreak attack; DeepSeek; GPT-4

1. Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs), including OpenAI's GPT family (e.g., ChatGPT [1], GPT-4 [2]) and the DeepSeek series (e.g., DeepSeek-LLM [3], DeepSeek-R1 [4]), have achieved strong performance in a wide range of Natural Language Processing (NLP) tasks, including text generation, summarization, and reasoning. Their use has expanded across domains such as education, healthcare, and customer service, bringing LLMs into applications where safety and reliability are important considerations. This expansion also exposes these systems to new security risks, particularly those targeting their alignment mechanisms.

Jailbreak attacks [5,6] are a prominent example of such risks. By designing adversarial prompts that bypass safety constraints, attackers can cause LLMs to generate harmful or restricted content. Prior evaluations have shown that even advanced models, including GPT-4, Claude-1 and Claude-2, and PaLM-2, remain vulnerable to these attacks [6,7]. Such vulnerabilities can be exploited to produce harmful outputs, including hate speech, privacy violations, and instructions for illegal activities [8]. These failures not only enable direct misuse but also affect user confidence in the reliability of LLM-based systems.

Existing defenses have attempted to improve jailbreak robustness through approaches such as Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) [9] and chain-of-thought-based safety mechanisms [10]. However, these techniques have not eliminated jailbreak vulnerabilities, and current LLMs still exhibit varying levels of resistance under different attack settings. This motivates a systematic investigation of how different large language models perform against jailbreak attacks under a standardized adversarial evaluation framework.

Although jailbreak robustness has been extensively studied for closed-source models such as GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Claude, systematic evaluations of recently released open-source models remain relatively scarce. This gap is increasingly relevant as open-source LLMs continue to be adopted in practical applications.

DeepSeek-R1 is a representative open-source model that has attracted considerable attention due to its strong reasoning capabilities and public availability. Its release reflects a broader trend toward accessible large-scale language models. However, the extent to which DeepSeek-R1 can withstand jailbreak attacks remains unclear, particularly when compared with widely used closed-source models such as GPT-3.5 and GPT-4. A direct evaluation under a unified adversarial setting is therefore needed to understand whether open-source models exhibit similar or different safety behaviors.

In this work, we evaluate DeepSeek-R1 through its publicly available distilled variants ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters. These variants are dense models based on Qwen and Llama architectures and represent the practical deployment forms of DeepSeek-R1. Consequently, architectural factors such as the Mixture-of-Experts design used in the flagship model are not considered variables in our comparison.

In this paper, we present a standardized comparative evaluation of jailbreak resilience under controlled attack conditions, offering timely insights into the robustness of state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source LLMs. Specifically, we conduct in-depth assessment of the DeepSeek model family in comparison with the GPT series. Leveraging HarmBench as the primary evaluation suite, we benchmark both model families against a diverse set of jailbreak strategies and report aggregate Attack Success Rates (ASR). Our results reveal that GPT models, e.g., GPT-4 and GPT-4 Turbo, exhibit stronger and more consistent robustness overall, while DeepSeek demonstrates selective resistance to automated and gradient-based attacks but remains significantly more susceptible to prompt-based and human-engineered exploits. Through further categorizing harmful behaviors by functional and semantic dimensions, we find that GPT models maintain safety constraints across categories, whereas DeepSeek shows limitations in effectively generalizing safety alignment across different inputs.

To the best of our knowledge, this work presents the first standardized comparative evaluation of the jailbreak robustness of DeepSeek-series models in comparison to GPT-series models. Our key contributions are as follows:

- We present the large-scale, systematic investigation of jailbreak robustness in open-source LLMs, benchmarking the DeepSeek family against GPT-series models under a standardized evaluation framework.
- We compare DeepSeek's framework with GPT, on alignment behavior and safety robustness, employing functional and semantic categorizations for fine-grained assessment.
- We evaluate seven representative attack strategies and surface findings that go beyond the expected RLHF-vs-limited-tuning gap: an inverse scaling effect in which larger DeepSeek models become more vulnerable, an attack-specific mirror-image weakness (DeepSeek fails under direct optimization attacks whereas GPT fails under disguised ones), and pronounced domain-level asymmetries.
- We demonstrate that GPT-series models exhibit more consistent and generalizable robustness across behavioral domains, whereas DeepSeek shows selective strengths but limited alignment generalization under diverse jailbreak scenarios.

We articulate the objectives of this study through the following systematically formulated research questions (RQs).

(1) **RQ1:** How do jailbreaks bypass alignment, and how does this change behavior across task types?
(2) **RQ2:** How do jailbreak attacks differentially impact the DeepSeek and GPT model families, and which attacks prove most effective against each?
(3) **RQ3:** Which underlying factors, including configuration choices, and alignment methods, drive the observed disparities in jailbreak robustness?
(4) **RQ4:** What open challenges remain in mitigating jailbreak vulnerabilities, and how can comparative insights from DeepSeek and GPT models inform the development of more robust and generalizable defenses for future LLMs?

Scope and Methodology

We categorize jailbreak attacks along two dimensions: the adversary's access level (black-box or white-box) and the underlying attack mechanism. For black-box settings, we consider context-based, prompt-rewriting, and LLM-based attacks, while white-box settings include gradient-based and logit-based approaches. The selected attacks

satisfy three criteria: they represent distinct attack mechanisms, can be evaluated within a unified HarmBench-based framework, and remain applicable across the target model families. Since white-box methods require access to model parameters, their evaluation is limited to the open-weight DeepSeek models. Therefore, this work focuses on a controlled comparative evaluation rather than a comprehensive survey of all existing jailbreak methods. The limitations and remaining challenges are discussed in Sections 4 and 5.

2. Jailbreak Attacks

A jailbreak attack is an adversarial technique that aims to bypass the alignment mechanisms of Large Language Models (LLMs) and induce behaviors that conflict with their intended safety objectives. Instead of directly requesting restricted information, attackers design inputs that exploit weaknesses in model responses to elicit unsafe outputs. These inputs may be manually crafted, generated with the assistance of other models, or refined through repeated interactions with the target model. Figure 1 presents a taxonomy of representative jailbreak approaches.



Figure 1. Taxonomy of jailbreak attacks [5,6,11–54].

The success of jailbreak attacks is largely attributed to the gap between alignment-time behaviors and responses elicited under adversarial conditions. By altering prompts, contexts, or interaction patterns, attackers can reveal situations where safety constraints fail to generalize across different inputs. A common manifestation is inconsistent refusal behavior, where semantically similar requests receive different responses depending on their formulation. Evaluating such failures provides important insights into the robustness of current LLM alignment strategies.

From the adversary's perspective, jailbreak attacks are typically classified into white-box and black-box settings according to the level of model access, as summarized in Table 1. In white-box attacks, the adversary can access internal model information, including parameters, gradients, or intermediate representations. This access enables direct optimization of adversarial objectives and often results in highly effective attacks. However, the requirement for internal access limits the applicability of white-box methods in real-world deployment scenarios.

Black-box attacks, in contrast, assume that the adversary can only query the target model and observe its outputs. Without access to internal states, attackers rely on techniques such as prompt engineering, automated search, iterative refinement, and surrogate modeling to identify effective jailbreak prompts. Although these methods face greater uncertainty due to limited feedback, they better represent attacks against publicly accessible LLM services. The following sections review representative white-box and black-box jailbreak methods, focusing on their threat models, attack mechanisms, and practical limitations.

2.1. White-Box Attacks

White-box jailbreak attacks can be further categorized by the depth of adversarial intervention in the model's internal decision pipeline.

2.1.1. Gradient-Based Attacks

Gradient-based jailbreak attacks exploit access to model gradients to optimize adversarial inputs that increase the probability of unsafe responses. Early studies primarily explored token-level optimization. Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) [6] introduced an iterative suffix search strategy based on top-k token replacement and demonstrated strong transferability across different models. Subsequent works improve this optimization paradigm from several perspectives. I-GCG [40] enhances search efficiency through multi-coordinate updates, while AutoDAN [44] incorporates structural constraints to generate more readable adversarial suffixes. ASETF [42] extends optimization into the embedding space before converting continuous perturbations into discrete tokens. Other approaches investigate sequence-level search strategies [38], query-efficient refinement under limited budgets [39], and objectives designed to improve cross-model transferability [43]. GCG++ [5] further explores lower-access scenarios through proxy-based optimization. Despite their effectiveness, gradient-based approaches typically depend on internal optimization signals, which limits their applicability to closed-source or remotely hosted LLMs.

Table 1. Overview of jailbreak methods for LLMs. **Threat Model**: attack surfaces (*Input*, *Model*, *System*, *Human&Social*); ✓ indicates coverage. **Attack Type**: ● = black-box, ❍ = white-box. **Target Model**: V (Vicuna), L (LLaMA), G (GPT), Q (Qwen), M (Mixtral). **Transferability**: ✓ reported, ✗ not reported, / not applicable. **Reproducibility**: ● released, ❍ not released. **Benchmark**: ✓ indicates evaluation on public benchmarks (e.g., HarmBench [55], EasyJailbreak [56]).

Paper	Threat Model				Attack Type	Target Model	Transferability	Reproducibility	Benchmark
	Input	Model	System	Human&Social					
[11]	✓	-	-	-	●	L, G, C, M	/	●	✓
[12]	-	-	✓	-	●	G	/	●	✗
[13]	✓	-	-	✓	●	G	/	●	✗
[14,15]	✓	-	-	-	●	V, L, G	/	❍	✓
[16]	✓	-	-	-	●	L, G	/	●	✗
[17]	✓	-	-	-	●	L, G	/	●	✗
[18]	✓	-	-	-	●	L, G, C	/	●	✓
[20]	✓	-	-	-	●	V, L, G, M	/	●	✗
[21]	✓	-	-	-	●	V, L	/	●	✓
[22,24]	✓	-	-	-	●	L, G, C, M	/	●	✗
[23,30]	✓	-	✓	-	●	G	/	●	✗
[25]	✓	-	-	✓	●	L, G, C	/	●	✗
[26]	✓	-	-	-	●	V, L, G	/	●	✓
[27]	✓	-	-	-	●	G	/	●	✓
[28]	✓	-	✓	✓	●	C	/	❍	✗
[29,32]	✓	-	✓	-	●	V, L, G, C	/	●	✓
[31]	✓	✓	-	-	●	L, G	/	❍	✗
[33]	✓	-	-	-	●	L, G	/	●	✗
[34]	✓	-	-	-	●	V, L, G	/	●	✓
[35]	✓	-	-	✓	●	V, G, C	/	❍	✗
[36]	-	-	✓	✓	●	G	/	●	✗
[37]	✓	-	-	✓	●	L, G	✓	●	✓
[57]	✓	-	-	-	●	G, C	/	●	✗
[5]	✓	-	-	-	❍	L	✓	●	✗
[6,44]	✓	-	-	-	❍	V, L	✓	●	✓
[38]	✓	-	-	-	❍	L	✗	❍	✗
[40,41]	✓	-	-	-	❍	V, L, M	✓	●	✓
[39,42]	✓	-	-	-	❍	V, L, M	✓	❍	✗
[43]	✓	-	-	-	❍	V, L	✓	●	✗
[46]	✓	-	-	-	❍	V, L, M	✓	●	✗
[48]	✓	-	-	-	❍	L	✗	●	✗
[49]	✓	-	-	-	❍	V, L	✗	❍	✗
[50]	✓	-	✓	-	❍	V, L	✗	●	✗
[51]	✓	-	-	-	❍	L	✓	●	✗
[52]	-	✓	-	-	❍	L	✓	●	✓
[53]	-	✓	✓	-	❍	L,V	✗	●	✗

2.1.2. Logit-Based Attacks

Logit-based attacks reduce the reliance on gradient information by exploiting partial access to model output distributions. Instead of modifying the input through gradient optimization, these methods manipulate token

probabilities or decoding trajectories to bypass safety constraints. Zhang et al. [49] show that controlling the selection of low-probability tokens can induce unsafe generations. COLD [46] formulates jailbreak generation as constrained decoding to balance attack objectives with linguistic coherence. Other studies leverage inherent response biases, including affirmative tendencies [45], latent directions related to refusal behavior [47], and probability perturbations during decoding [50]. DSN [51] further improves attack effectiveness by adjusting the relative probabilities of refusal and affirmative tokens at early decoding stages. Compared with gradient-based methods, logit-based attacks require weaker access assumptions while retaining competitive performance. However, their practical applicability remains constrained by the availability of probability-level outputs, which are often unavailable in commercial APIs.

2.1.3. Fine-Tuning-Based Attacks

Fine-tuning-based attacks operate at the parameter level by updating model weights with adversarially selected training data. Rather than exploiting individual prompts or decoding behaviors, these methods aim to alter the model's learned response patterns and weaken existing alignment. Qi et al. [52] demonstrate that injecting a small number of harmful examples during fine-tuning can substantially reduce safety performance. Yang et al. [53] further show that limited adversarial fine-tuning can increase vulnerability to jailbreak prompts. Zhan et al. [54] investigate how adversarial samples interfere with RLHF-based safeguards and promote unsafe responses. Although parameter-level attacks can induce broader behavioral changes than prompt-based methods, they require access to model weights and additional training procedures, making them difficult to apply against closed-source systems.

Overall, white-box jailbreak attacks can be understood from the perspective of where the attack intervenes in the model pipeline: input optimization through gradients, generation control through logits, and parameter adaptation through fine-tuning. This view captures the different access requirements and practical constraints associated with each attack category, rather than assuming a single ordering of attack effectiveness.

2.2. Black-Box Attacks

Black-box jailbreak attacks assume query-only access to the target model and can be categorized according to how adversaries construct malicious inputs and exploit model feedback. Unlike white-box methods, these attacks do not require internal model information and instead rely on observable input-output behaviors to identify prompts that bypass alignment constraints.

2.2.1. Context-Based Attacks

Context-based attacks exploit the in-context learning capability of LLMs by inserting adversarial demonstrations into the prompt. By extending interactions from single-turn queries to few-shot or long-context settings, these attacks induce models to follow undesirable patterns through contextual conditioning. Wei et al. [15] reveal that adversarial demonstrations can exploit the in-context learning behavior of LLMs, causing models to follow unsafe patterns through contextual conditioning rather than explicit instruction violations. Building on this observation, Wang et al. [14] introduce optimization-based strategies for constructing effective demonstrations and show that attack performance is influenced by both demonstration quantity and quality. Later studies extend this idea beyond manually provided examples to long-context settings [11] and retrieval-augmented systems, where adversarial information injected into external knowledge sources can affect model outputs [12]. Despite their effectiveness, context-based attacks remain limited by practical constraints such as prompt length, context-window capacity, and the model's sensitivity to demonstration selection.

2.2.2. Prompt-Rewriting Attacks

Prompt-rewriting attacks bypass safety mechanisms by transforming harmful requests into alternative forms while preserving their underlying intent. Rather than modifying the surrounding context, these approaches manipulate the surface representation of adversarial queries to evade safety checks. Existing methods explore various rewriting strategies, including encrypted or encoded prompts [27], puzzle-based transformations [17], tokenization-aware perturbations such as emoji and structured noise [22,24], citation-based manipulation [25], and language-game formulations [57]. Automated rewriting frameworks further improve scalability through evolutionary search and fuzzing techniques [21,26]. Recent studies investigate cross-model transferability by analyzing token importance and converting unsafe requests into semantically indirect forms [20,23]. Compared with context-based approaches, rewriting methods require fewer assumptions about prompt capacity and are easier to apply in practical scenarios, although their success depends on the robustness of semantic understanding and filtering mechanisms.

2.2.3. LLM-Based Attacks

LLM-based attacks use auxiliary language models to automate the generation, refinement, and evaluation of jailbreak prompts. By incorporating iterative feedback and search strategies, these approaches reduce reliance on manually constructed attacks and improve scalability. Representative examples include adversarial prompt generators such as MasterKey [30], attacker-target interaction frameworks such as PAIR [29,33], tree-search-based methods such as Tree of Attacks with Pruning (TAP) [34], and multi-agent or persuasion-based frameworks [28,32,35,37]. These methods can adapt their generation strategies based on model responses and auxiliary feedback, often achieving competitive performance across different target models. Nevertheless, their effectiveness depends on auxiliary model capability, computational cost, and the availability of informative feedback signals.

Overall, black-box jailbreak attacks differ primarily in how they exploit model behavior under limited access: contextual manipulation through demonstrations, semantic transformation of adversarial requests, and automated attack generation assisted by language models. This taxonomy highlights differences in attack mechanisms and automation strategies while providing a basis for analyzing how different LLMs respond to diverse jailbreak paradigms.

2.2.4. Jailbreak Attacks in GPT

A substantial body of work demonstrates that GPT-series models (e.g., GPT-3.5, GPT-4) remain vulnerable to a wide range of jailbreak attacks, even in black-box settings where adversaries lack access to model parameters.

Context-Based Attacks

JAILBREAKHUB [58] provides a large-scale empirical analysis of context-based jailbreak strategies by collecting 15,140 prompts from 131 strategy communities and identifying 1405 successful attacks. The study covers diverse attack patterns, including prompt injection, privilege escalation, and environment emulation, and evaluates their effectiveness across 13 sensitive domains. The results show that even proprietary models such as GPT-4 remain vulnerable to carefully constructed contextual attacks, with some prompts achieving high attack success rates.

Prompt-Rewriting Attacks

Prompt-rewriting methods bypass safety mechanisms by transforming harmful requests into alternative representations while preserving their underlying intent. ArtPrompt [18] exploits the difficulty of LLMs in interpreting ASCII-based encodings and demonstrates that visually transformed instructions can evade conventional safety filtering. Under the Vision-in-Text Challenge (VITC), GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 achieve limited accuracy on ASCII interpretation, revealing a weakness in handling encoded inputs. Beyond manual transformations, transfer-based GCG variants [6] optimize adversarial suffixes across multiple open-source models and generate prompts that transfer to GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 without direct access to their parameters.

LLM-Based Attacks

Recent studies further automate jailbreak generation by introducing auxiliary LLMs into the attack process. PAIR [29] performs iterative attacker-target interactions to refine prompts based on model feedback, enabling efficient discovery of jailbreaks with limited queries. TAP [34] combines prompt generation with evaluator-guided search and pruning to improve attack efficiency. Persuasive Adversarial Prompt (PAP) [37] explores persuasion-based strategies and demonstrates that adversarial prompting can exploit social and linguistic behaviors beyond token-level optimization. Together, these results indicate that proprietary models with strong alignment can still exhibit vulnerabilities under adaptive black-box attacks.

2.2.5. Jailbreak Attacks in DeepSeek

Recent evaluations suggest that reasoning-oriented models such as DeepSeek-R1 introduce additional safety challenges due to their extended reasoning capabilities. In black-box settings, Chain-of-Lure [59] employs multi-turn deceptive narratives to gradually guide models toward harmful outputs, while RACE [60] reformulates harmful requests as structured reasoning tasks to evade safety constraints. Multi-agent approaches, such as amplified jailbreaks [61], further improve attack effectiveness by coordinating role-playing and narrative escalation strategies.

Open-weight models also enable white-box analysis that is unavailable for proprietary systems. H-CoT [62] investigates vulnerabilities associated with exposing internal Chain-of-Thought traces and shows that reasoning information can introduce additional attack surfaces. Hybrid approaches, including GCG combined with PAIR or WordGame [63], integrate gradient-based optimization with semantic refinement to improve attack performance. These studies further reveal limitations of existing defenses, including Gradient Cuff [64] and JBShield [65], against

adaptive attack combinations.

Beyond attack construction, Zhou et al. [66] conduct a systematic safety evaluation of DeepSeek-R1 and compare it with other reasoning models such as OpenAI's o3-mini. Their findings indicate that DeepSeek-R1 exhibits weaker performance on several safety benchmarks and may generate harmful intermediate reasoning traces even when final responses appear aligned. This observation suggests that evaluating only final outputs may overlook safety risks associated with internal reasoning processes.

Overall, existing studies show that both proprietary and open-source LLMs remain vulnerable to increasingly adaptive jailbreak strategies. While DeepSeek-R1 demonstrates strong reasoning capability, its extended reasoning process and open-weight availability introduce additional evaluation challenges, motivating a more systematic comparison of jailbreak robustness across different model families.

Takeaways. 2

Section 2 addresses **RQ1**. Jailbreaks bypass alignment by manipulating multiple stages of the model's decision pipeline rather than exploiting a single loophole. They suppress refusal behavior by reshaping context, disguising intent, and perturbing latent safety directions, ranging from behavior imitation (context-based attacks) to semantic obfuscation (prompt-rewriting) to steering of decoding dynamics (optimization-based methods). As a result, jailbreaks change behavior across task types: simple Q&A cases tend to produce harmful outputs, while reasoning or role-playing tasks instead encourage the model to justify and elaborate unsafe actions. This demonstrates that jailbreak robustness is a multi-mechanism safety problem, not a surface-level filtering issue.

3. Experiment

In this section, we will present the evaluation results of the adversarial robustness of the GPT and DeepSeek model families, followed by an analysis of overall performance and performance on specific behaviors.

3.1. Dataset

HarmBench [55] provides a standardized benchmark for evaluating LLM safety under adversarial conditions. The benchmark adopts a fixed split, with 100 harmful behaviors reserved for validation and 410 for testing, reducing the risk of overfitting and improving reproducibility across evaluations. Its data curation follows several principles, including maintaining realistic misuse scenarios, covering behaviors with different levels of harm, and excluding ambiguous prompts whose intent may vary across contexts.

Overall, HarmBench contains 510 adversarial behaviors, including 400 text-based and 110 multimodal cases, covering a broad range of malicious, unethical, and illegal scenarios. These behaviors are organized into four categories: standard, copyright, contextual, and multimodal prompts, each representing different structural or contextual characteristics (see Appendix A). The fixed taxonomy and controlled data partition enable consistent comparison of jailbreak methods across different LLMs and attack settings. Since all models evaluated in this work are text-only, we use the 320 text-based behaviors in the test split (159 standard, 81 contextual, and 80 copyright); the multimodal category and the validation split are excluded.

3.2. Evaluated Models

We evaluate five DeepSeek-R1 distilled variants with different parameter scales (1.5B, 7B, 8B, 14B, and 32B) to study how model size relates to jailbreak robustness under adversarial prompting. All evaluated models are dense architectures, including the Qwen-based DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen variants (1.5B, 7B, 14B, and 32B) and the Llama-based DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B, loaded in `float16` precision.

For comparison, we include four GPT releases: GPT-3.5 Turbo 0613, GPT-3.5 Turbo 1106, GPT-4 0613, and GPT-4 Turbo 1106. Their attack success rates are adopted from the publicly reported HarmBench evaluation [55] under the same model versions, ensuring consistency with prior benchmark results. All models are evaluated following the HarmBench protocol, which provides a unified set of harmful behaviors and evaluation criteria across different model families.

Since white-box attacks require access to model parameters, they can only be performed on the open-weight DeepSeek models. Therefore, cross-family comparisons between DeepSeek and GPT are conducted using black-box attacks, while white-box results are analyzed separately to examine robustness variations within the DeepSeek model family. For GPT models, the OpenAI API used in this study does not introduce additional moderation or post-processing beyond the returned model outputs, and the reported results correspond to the completions directly provided by the API.

3.3. Evaluation Metrics

We evaluate jailbreak effectiveness using the Attack Success Rate (ASR) defined by the HarmBench framework [55]. ASR measures the percentage of adversarial prompts that successfully induce unsafe or policy-violating responses from the target model. A higher ASR indicates that the model is more susceptible to the evaluated jailbreak attacks.

Following HarmBench, we use classifier-based evaluation to determine whether a generated response constitutes a successful jailbreak. For non-copyright behaviors, HarmBench employs a binary classifier based on Llama-2-13B-Chat, which is fine-tuned on manually labeled model responses according to predefined success criteria. For copyright-related behaviors, a hashing-based classifier is used to detect near-verbatim reproduction of protected content. Since this classifier targets direct reproduction rather than broader discussion of copyrighted material, low copyright ASR values for larger DeepSeek variants are consistent with their tendency to avoid generating protected text verbatim.

This evaluation protocol provides a standardized criterion for comparing jailbreak attacks across different models and attack categories while reducing dependence on manual judgment.

3.4. Implementation Details

For target-model generation, we use deterministic decoding with temperature set to 0, without nucleus sampling or top-k sampling. Each generation is limited to a maximum of 512 new tokens, and no additional system prompt or safety prefix is applied. The attack-specific query budgets are summarized in Table 2. For LLM-based attacks, including PAIR, TAP-T, PAP, and ZeroShot, we use Mixtral-8x7B-Instruct-v0.1 as the attacker model. Mixtral also serves as the in-loop evaluator for PAIR, PAP, and ZeroShot, whereas TAP-T uses gpt-4-0613 as its in-loop judge. AutoDAN uses Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2 as the mutation model. Regardless of the attack-specific generation process, the final ASR for all methods is computed using HarmBench's official `Llama-2-13b-cls` classifier. All experiments are conducted using the HarmBench evaluation harness with vLLM 0.6.3 and PyTorch 2.4 on NVIDIA A100 80 GB GPUs. The complete attack configurations and the evaluation scripts used in this study are provided in the Supplementary Materials.

Table 2. Attack configurations under the standardized HarmBench harness.

Attack	Key Settings
GCG	500 steps; search width 512; 20-token adversarial suffix; ASCII-only
GCG-T	500 steps; search width 1024; suffix optimized over an ensemble {Llama-2-7B, Vicuna-7B, Llama-2-13B, Vicuna-13B} and then transferred
AutoDAN	100 iterations; batch size 64; elite ratio 0.1; crossover 0.5; mutation rate 0.01; mutator Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.2
TAP-T	width 10; depth 10; branching factor 4
PAIR	20 parallel streams $\times$ 3 refinement steps ($\leq$60 queries per behavior)
PAP	top-5 persuasion techniques
ZeroShot	5 test cases per behavior; generation temperature 0.9, top-p 0.95
DR	behavior issued directly (baseline)

3.5. Evaluation Results

3.5.1. General Performance

We evaluate and compare the DeepSeek and GPT model families under black-box and white-box jailbreak taxonomies. White-box evaluation, applied only to DeepSeek models, includes gradient-based (GCG [6], AutoDAN [44]) and logit-based (H-CoT) attacks [62]. Cross-family comparison further incorporates context-based (Human) [58], prompt-rewrite (GCG-T [6], ArtPrompt [18]), and LLM-based (PAIR [29], TAP-T [34], PAP [37], ZeroShot) attacks. A Direct Request (DR) setting serves as the baseline.

As shown in Table 3, for prompt-rewrite attacks, GPT-4 variants remain most robust on GCG-T, GPT-3.5 is most vulnerable, and DeepSeek lies between them, increasing moderately with size. For ArtPrompt, DeepSeek becomes easier to jailbreak as scale grows, while GPT-4 stays much lower. For LLM-based attacks, PAIR again shows GPT-4 as most robust, GPT-3.5-0613 as notably high, and DeepSeek rising from 27.81% (1.5B) to 36.74% (32B). TAP-T is strong across models, peaking at 63.00% for GPT-3.5-0613 and 57.70% for GPT-4 Turbo; DeepSeek similarly scales from 36.88% to 52.81%. PAP remains comparatively low for both families. ZeroShot shows clearer gaps: DeepSeek is higher at 33–40%, while GPT-4 is 12.70–18.90% and GPT-3.5 is 24.40–28.70%. For context-based and baseline measures, HumanJailbreak shows GPT-4 Turbo as most robust, whereas DeepSeek clusters around 39–42%. On the DR baseline, GPT-4 Turbo is again lowest, GPT-4 0613 is 20.90%, GPT-3.5 ranges 22.20–33.80%, and DeepSeek ranges 34.38–41.56%.

Table 3. Evaluation results of black-box jailbreaks on GPT-series and DeepSeek-series models. GPT-series results are adopted from HarmBench [55].

Method	Baseline	Context-Based	Prompt Rewrite		LLM-Based			
	DR	Human	GCG-T	ArtPrompt	PAIR	TAP-T	PAP	ZeroShot
DeepSeek_1.5b	34.38	30.69	32.54	32.81	27.81	36.88	15.87	35.80
DeepSeek_7b	40.94	39.13	34.36	40.94	30.94	50.94	20.63	40.40
DeepSeek_8b	41.56	41.62	37.94	27.36	33.00	47.50	18.44	38.60
DeepSeek_14b	41.56	41.19	36.18	44.06	34.38	50.00	17.19	33.20
DeepSeek_32b	40.00	41.19	39.25	45.03	36.74	52.81	19.38	34.37
GPT-3.5 Turbo 0613	22.20	24.70	38.60	32.81	47.80	63.00	15.20	24.40
GPT-3.5 Turbo 1106	33.80	3.10	42.60	36.56	36.30	47.60	11.30	28.70
GPT-4 0613	20.90	12.10	22.50	22.96	22.50	55.80	17.00	18.90
GPT-4 Turbo 1106	9.70	2.60	22.30	22.40	22.30	57.70	11.60	12.70

Within the DeepSeek series, attack success generally increases with model size. As shown in Table 4, GCG rises from 33.44% at 1.5B to 55.31% at 32B, AutoDAN from 24.08% to 44.06%. H-CoT shows a near-monotonic increase from 35.50% to 51.74%. The strongest method also shifts with scale: at 1.5B, H-CoT is highest; at 7–8B, H-CoT, GCG, and AutoDAN cluster around 43–45%; and by 32B, GCG leads with H-CoT second. Variability across attack methods also grows, with the performance range expanding from 11.42 points at 1.5B to 15.31 points at 32B, indicating a broader and more exploitable attack surface at larger scales. Relative to the DR baseline, scaling effects are clear: GCG moves from -0.94 at 1.5B to +15.31 at 32B, and H-CoT from 1.12 to 11.74. AutoDAN tracks DR closely from 7B onward, but falls 10.30 points below it at 1.5B and dips slightly at 14B. Thus, GCG shows the largest gain with scale, followed by AutoDAN and H-CoT; by 32B, however, GCG and H-CoT reach the highest margins over DR (+15.31 and +11.74), whereas AutoDAN remains closest to the baseline (+4.06). These trends suggest defenses should prioritize GCG-style adversarial training and refusal mechanisms sensitive to chain-of-thought reasoning, and robustness is better assessed by margin over DR rather than absolute success rates.

Table 4. Evaluation results of white-box jailbreaks on DeepSeek-series models.

Model	Baseline	Gradient-Based		Logit-Based
	DR	GCG	AutoDAN	H-CoT
DeepSeek_1.5b	34.38	33.44	24.08	35.50
DeepSeek_7b	40.94	43.13	43.43	43.65
DeepSeek_8b	41.56	44.69	42.03	43.83
DeepSeek_14b	41.56	35.90	40.00	46.00
DeepSeek_32b	40.00	55.31	44.06	51.74

In summary, the analysis reveals that GPT-4 and GPT-4 Turbo demonstrate the strongest robustness across all categories, whereas DeepSeek models exhibit increasing susceptibility as their scale grows. Exceptions include TAP-T, which remains consistently effective against all models, and ZeroShot, where DeepSeek performs remarkably worse than GPT-4. When normalized to the DR baseline, GCG and H-CoT reach the highest relative risk at the largest scale, whereas AutoDAN, despite a comparable increase, remains closest to the DR baseline in vulnerability. These findings indicate that GPT-4's alignment provides greater resilience than the robustness improvements implemented in DeepSeek. Practically, evaluations should report both absolute success rates and performance uplift relative to DR, while mitigation strategies should prioritize GCG-oriented adversarial training, refusal mechanisms sensitive to chain-of-thought reasoning, and systematic monitoring of safety consistency in large-scale models. Meanwhile, Appendix B presents a detailed qualitative analysis of representative model responses. The case studies reveal that DeepSeek may generate structured and policy-violating outputs under GCG-T, such as detailed chemical synthesis plans, yet demonstrate comparatively stronger adherence to safety constraints when exposed to strategically disguised TAP-T prompts.

3.5.2. Performance on Specific Behaviors

We evaluate jailbreak attack success rates (ASR) for DeepSeek and GPT models across three HarmBench behavioral categories. As shown in Figure 2, DeepSeek variants achieve higher ASRs than GPT models in the Standard and Contextual categories under the evaluated jailbreak attacks. Within the Contextual category, DeepSeek-32B, DeepSeek-14B, and DeepSeek-8B obtain ASRs of 0.7796, 0.8203, and 0.7630, respectively. The

variation across model scales suggests that parameter scaling alone does not monotonically improve resistance to context-based jailbreak attacks.



(**a**) DeepSeek-series models (**b**) GPT-series models

Figure 2. ASR of DeepSeek and GPT under the all-behaviors dataset.

A similar pattern is observed for Standard behaviors. DeepSeek-32B achieves an ASR of 0.4833, compared with 0.2489 for GPT-4 Turbo and 0.228 for GPT-4 (0613), showing higher susceptibility to prompt-based jailbreak strategies in the evaluated benchmark. In contrast, the Copyright category exhibits the opposite trend. GPT-4 (0613) and GPT-4 Turbo achieve ASRs of 0.1106 and 0.0386, respectively, whereas DeepSeek records an ASR of 0.0091 for the 1.5B variant and 0 for larger variants. This difference is consistent with the design of the HarmBench copyright classifier, which primarily detects near-verbatim reproduction of protected content rather than general copyright-related discussion.

Overall, the results reveal that jailbreak resistance is attack-dependent and varies across behavioral categories. DeepSeek shows lower ASR on copyright-related behaviors but higher susceptibility to several prompt- and context-based jailbreak attacks compared with GPT models under the same evaluation protocol. These findings suggest that safety alignment performance should be assessed across diverse attack categories rather than summarized by a single aggregate robustness measure.

We further analyze jailbreak behavior across six high-risk semantic domains. As shown in Figure 3, the two model families exhibit different vulnerability patterns across harmful behaviors. In most domains, DeepSeek variants achieve higher ASRs than GPT models. For example, DeepSeek reaches an ASR of 0.6422 in misinformation-related behaviors, which is substantially higher than GPT models. Similar trends appear in cybercrime and illegal content categories, indicating that DeepSeek is more susceptible to several adversarial prompts targeting socially sensitive or restricted behaviors under the evaluated benchmark.



(**a**) ASR of GPT and DeepSeek under red-teaming attacks (**b**) ASR of GPT and DeepSeek under black-box attack (**c**) ASR of DeepSeek under white-box attack

Figure 3. ASRs of GPT and DeepSeek for different categories.

A different pattern appears in the chemical and biological domain, where GPT models exhibit higher ASR while DeepSeek variants successfully reject all evaluated jailbreak prompts. This result suggests that jailbreak resistance is highly dependent on the target behavior category rather than following a uniform trend across domains.

Overall, GPT models show more consistent refusal behavior across the evaluated categories, whereas DeepSeek exhibits larger variation between different safety domains. Figure 3b,c further provides a strategy-level analysis of how different jailbreak methods interact with the safety behavior of GPT and DeepSeek models.

For individual attack strategies, PAIR produces a different pattern from the overall trend. GPT models achieve slightly higher ASRs than DeepSeek in the Standard and Contextual categories, indicating that both model families remain susceptible to iterative prompt refinement. GPT models also exhibit limited copyright-related failures, whereas DeepSeek shows no successful cases under this attack. These results suggest that attack effectiveness depends not only on model alignment but also on the interaction between attack strategy and behavior category.

ZeroShot attacks reveal a larger performance gap between the two model families. DeepSeek achieves ASRs of approximately 77% and 74% in the Standard and Contextual categories, respectively, compared with approximately 19% and 40% for GPT models. Although DeepSeek shows stronger resistance under some optimization-based attacks, these results indicate higher susceptibility to direct prompt-level jailbreak attempts. Minor copyright-related failures are observed for DeepSeek, while GPT maintains lower ASR in this category. Under PAP attacks, both model families achieve relatively low ASRs, suggesting stronger resistance against persuasion-based jailbreak prompts. DeepSeek obtains slightly lower ASR for Standard behaviors but higher ASR for Contextual behaviors, indicating that its response depends on how the harmful intent is embedded within the interaction context. HumanJailbreak attacks show a similar pattern, with GPT models maintaining lower ASR across both categories. Copyright-related failures remain rare for both models. For DR attacks, DeepSeek again exhibits higher ASR in both Standard and Contextual categories, while GPT models maintain lower and more stable attack success rates. These results indicate that DeepSeek's robustness varies more substantially across attack types, whereas GPT models exhibit more consistent behavior under the evaluated strategies. Optimization-based attacks present a mixed picture. TAP-T achieves the highest ASR among GPT models, consistent with previous observations that token-level adversarial optimization can bypass alignment mechanisms. In contrast, DeepSeek shows lower susceptibility to TAP-T and no observed copyright-related failures. However, under GCG-T, DeepSeek obtains higher ASRs than GPT models in both Standard and Contextual categories, demonstrating that its robustness does not generalize uniformly across different optimization-based attacks. Both model families exhibit limited copyright-related failures under GCG-T, although GPT models show slightly higher ASR values.

Takeaways. 3

This analysis addresses **RQ2**, examining how jailbreak attacks differentially affect DeepSeek and GPT models. Results show DeepSeek is more vulnerable to **direct and aggressive attacks** (e.g., GCG-T), often generating detailed policy-violating outputs. GPT models, though more robust against overt attacks, are susceptible to subtle or linguistically disguised prompts, where coherent responses may inadvertently enable policy circumvention. These differences reveal **attack-specific weaknesses** in the evaluated models.

4. Discussion

The comparative evaluation of DeepSeek and GPT models under jailbreak attacks highlights key factors influencing robustness, including model scale, configuration, and alignment strategies. GPT-4 and GPT-4 Turbo demonstrate lower ASR and more consistent refusal behavior, indicating stronger safety alignment. However, DeepSeek shows greater variability under adversarial pressure. These findings underscore trade-offs between model capacity and alignment effectiveness, emphasizing the need to further examine their combined impact on robustness.

4.1. Determinants of Jailbreak Robustness

Our analysis suggests that jailbreak robustness is influenced by two major factors: model scale and post-training alignment. We emphasize that these factors represent plausible explanations consistent with our observations rather than experimentally isolated causes. Separating their individual effects would require controlled interventions on model architecture and training pipelines.

4.1.1. Scaling Effects

Increasing model scale improves general capability, but our results show that larger models do not necessarily achieve stronger jailbreak resistance. For example, under GCG attacks, the ASR of DeepSeek variants increases from 33.44% at 1.5B to 55.31% at 32B.

4.1.2. Alignment Strategies

Differences in post-training alignment may also contribute to the observed gap between model families. GPT models have undergone extensive safety-oriented post-training procedures, including RLHF, refusal tuning, and large-scale evaluation. In comparison, open-weight models provide greater accessibility and flexibility but may exhibit different safety behaviors depending on their alignment pipelines and released checkpoints. Such differences can affect how models respond to adversarial reformulations, contextual manipulation, and persuasion-based attacks. Therefore, jailbreak robustness should be considered as a combined outcome of model capacity, training objectives, and alignment procedures rather than a direct consequence of architecture or scale alone.

Takeaways. 4

This analysis addresses **RQ3** and identifies two factors associated with jailbreak robustness:

- **Scaling**: Increasing model size does not consistently improve jailbreak resistance, indicating that capacity growth alone is insufficient for safety improvement;
- **Alignment**: Differences in post-training alignment procedures contribute to variations in refusal behavior across model families.

4.2. Implications for Future Research

The results suggest several directions for improving LLM safety evaluation and alignment. First, future alignment methods should better account for scaling effects by incorporating robustness objectives throughout post-training rather than treating safety as an independent final-stage adjustment. Second, defenses should be evaluated across diverse attack mechanisms and model families, since robustness against one jailbreak strategy does not necessarily transfer to others. Third, future benchmarks should combine static evaluations with adaptive red-teaming frameworks, multilingual testing, and dynamically generated attacks to better capture evolving threats. In addition, evaluation protocols should consider metrics beyond aggregate ASR, including attack transferability, refusal consistency, and robustness under distribution shifts.

4.3. Limitations

Several limitations should be considered when interpreting our results. (i) **Single benchmark and judge:** our evaluation relies on HarmBench and its Llama-2-13B classifier. Although the classifier is validated against human annotations, additional benchmarks such as JailbreakBench, EasyJailbreak, and human evaluation would further improve external validity. (ii) **Variance analysis:** ASR is measured over the full 320-behavior text test split under deterministic decoding, but confidence intervals across random seeds are not reported. (iii) **Model release differences:** GPT and DeepSeek models originate from different development periods, and differences in safety behavior may reflect variations in training and alignment pipelines rather than model family alone. (iv) **Asymmetric attack access:** white-box attacks are evaluated only on open-weight DeepSeek models, and therefore cross-family comparisons are limited to black-box settings. (v) **Model coverage:** our evaluation focuses on DeepSeek and GPT families, while broader comparisons with additional LLM families remain future work. Accordingly, our explanations regarding the sources of robustness differences should be interpreted as hypotheses rather than confirmed causal mechanisms.

4.4. Insights and Implications

Overall, our findings indicate that jailbreak robustness emerges from the interaction between model scale, alignment procedures, and attack characteristics. Larger models provide stronger capabilities but do not automatically achieve stronger resistance against adversarial prompting. Instead, maintaining reliable safety behavior requires alignment techniques that evolve alongside increasing model capacity. These observations motivate the development of adaptive evaluation frameworks and scalable alignment strategies for both proprietary and open-source LLMs.

5. Open Questions and Future Directions

5.1. Scaling Effects and Safety Consistency

Our evaluation suggests that increasing model scale does not necessarily translate into improved jailbreak resistance. For several attack categories, larger DeepSeek variants exhibit higher ASR, particularly under optimization-based attacks such as GCG and logit-oriented approaches such as H-CoT. These observations raise an important question: as model capacity increases, do existing alignment techniques remain sufficient to maintain consistent safety behavior? Future research should investigate scaling-aware alignment strategies, including adversarial training

procedures, safety-oriented regularization, and mechanisms that improve consistency across different response conditions. Understanding how safety objectives should evolve with model capacity is critical for determining whether larger models can achieve both stronger capabilities and reliable robustness against adversarial prompting.

5.2. Alignment Pipeline Adequacy and Scalability

The observed differences between proprietary and open-weight models highlight the importance of post-training alignment pipelines. Models developed with extensive safety-oriented training, including RLHF, supervised fine-tuning, and iterative evaluation, may benefit from broader exposure to adversarial behaviors. However, open-weight models may follow different alignment procedures due to variations in training resources, objectives, and release strategies. A key open question is how to design alignment pipelines that remain effective under limited resources while generalizing across tasks, domains, and modalities. Future work should explore the interaction between supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, adversarial training, and other alignment techniques, particularly in settings where large-scale human feedback is unavailable.

5.3. Evaluation Paradigm and Metrics

Existing jailbreak benchmarks provide standardized comparisons but may not fully capture adaptive and evolving attack behaviors. Although frameworks such as HarmBench improve reproducibility, they may underrepresent challenges arising from dynamically generated attacks, multilingual prompts, and continuously evolving adversarial strategies. Future evaluations should incorporate adaptive red-teaming pipelines, automated attack generation, and broader linguistic coverage to better characterize model robustness. In addition, relying solely on aggregate ASR may obscure differences in attack transferability, refusal consistency, and robustness across model scales. Developing more comprehensive evaluation metrics that capture these dimensions remains an important direction for future LLM safety research.

Takeaways. 5

This analysis addresses **RQ4**, outlining key challenges and future directions for mitigating jailbreak vulnerabilities:

- **Scaling effects**: Larger models face higher vulnerability under specific attacks, highlighting the need for scaling-aware safety alignment.
- **Alignment pipelines**: Extensive RLHF and multi-stage tuning enhance resilience; open-weight systems, however, demand more scalable and resource-efficient alignment strategies.
- **Evaluation limits**: Static benchmarks like HarmBench overlook multilingual and evolving threats, necessitating red-teaming, adversarial multi-agent testing, and robust metrics.

6. Conclusions

In this paper, we presented a comprehensive evaluation of the jailbreak robustness of DeepSeek-series models compared with GPT-series models. Our results show that although DeepSeek demonstrates selective resilience to gradient-based and automated attacks, it lacks the broad and consistent safety alignment exhibited by GPT-4, particularly against human-engineered and prompt-based adversarial attacks. DeepSeek also shows uneven robustness across high-risk domains such as misinformation and cybercrime, revealing limitations in generalized safety alignment, whereas GPT models achieve lower ASRs and more consistent refusal behaviors. These findings highlight a trade-off between model capability and safety robustness, emphasizing the need for scalable alignment strategies to ensure reliable and trustworthy AI deployment. More broadly, our study shows that model scaling and alignment effectiveness jointly shape the attack surface and overall safety of modern LLMs.

Supplementary Materials

The additional data and information can be downloaded at: https://media.sciltp.com/articles/others/2608201615090410/PC-26070214-SI.zip. To support reproducibility, the evaluation configurations and scripts (attack settings and the HarmBench harness configuration) are provided.

Author Contributions

X.W.: Conceptualization, methodology, software, formal analysis, investigation, visualization, writing (original draft preparation), and writing (review and editing). X.L.: Methodology, software, validation, data curation, investigation, visualization, writing (original draft preparation), and writing (review and editing). Q.L.: Validation, formal analysis, and writing (review and editing). L.L.: Investigation, data curation, and writing (review and editing).

J.N.: Supervision, conceptualization, and writing (review and editing). X.W. and X.L. contributed equally to this work. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of the manuscript.

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Institutional Review Board Statement

Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement

Not applicable.

Data Availability Statement

The data used in this study are publicly available. Specifically, the experiments were conducted using the HarmBench benchmark, available at https://github.com/centerforaisafety/HarmBench. Additional processed results supporting the findings of this study are included in the article and its Appendix. Further details are available from the corresponding author upon reasonable request.

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Conflicts of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Use of AI and AI-Assisted Technologies

During the preparation of this work, the authors used ChatGPT (OpenAI, 2025) and Claude (Anthropic, 2025) to improve the language, readability, and organization of the manuscript. All research design, experiments, data collection, analysis, results, and scientific conclusions are the authors' own. After using these tools, the authors reviewed and edited the content as needed and take full responsibility for the content of the published article.

Appendix A. Dataset

HarmBench organizes prompts into four behavioral categories, each presenting distinct challenges. The details of these categories are introduced in Table A1. **Standard behaviors** consist of self-contained prompts derived from legacy red teaming datasets and serve as a baseline. **Copyright behaviors** assess whether models reproduce protected content, using hash-based classifiers for evaluation. **Contextual behaviors** embed harmful intent within rich user profiles to test whether LLMs can misuse background information. Finally, **multimodal behaviors** incorporate visual stimuli, evaluating the robustness of vision-language models when confronted with security-sensitive imagery.

Table A1. Functional categories in HarmBench.

Category Type	Count	Description and Usage
Standard Behaviors	200	Single-sentence or short instructions without any context or additional input. Mainly used for baseline red teaming evaluations.
Copyright Behaviors	100	Explicitly require the model to generate copyrighted content. Used to assess copyright compliance. Detection is performed via hash-based matching.
Contextual Behaviors	100	Include detailed background (e.g., target individual's profession, hobbies, political views) and request a harmful action. Used to test whether the model generates harmful content in context-sensitive settings.
Multimodal Behaviors	110	Combine images (e.g., locks, chemical structures) with textual prompts. Designed to evaluate whether vision-language models exhibit vulnerabilities under visual prompting.

Appendix B. Case Study Analysis of Model Behavior under GCG-T and TAP-T Attacks

To further explore behavioral differences between DeepSeek and GPT-series models, we conducted two sets of case studies, each consisting of three representative examples targeting safety-critical and policy-violating prompts. The first set, shown in Figure A1, presents model responses under GCG-T attacks, while the second set, depicted in Figure A2, examines responses under TAP-T attacks. For these experiments, we selected "deepseek-distill-8b" (a distilled 8B model variant) as the representative DeepSeek model and "gpt-4-0613" as the representative GPT-series model. These qualitative analyses provide concrete illustrations of how jailbreak attacks impact model compliance and alignment, revealing distinct behavioral patterns between the two model families.



Figure A1. Examples of generated responses from GPT and DeepSeek under GCG-T attacks.

Under GCG-T attacks, DeepSeek models consistently produced detailed and contextually coherent responses even when prompted with highly sensitive or prohibited content. For instance, when asked for step-by-step instructions to synthesize the banned pesticide parathion, DeepSeek provided a structured multi-step chemical synthesis plan, including suggested reagents and conditions, whereas GPT refused to respond, citing safety and ethical constraints. Similarly, when prompted to compose a persuasive post encouraging parents to feed honey to infants, which is medically discouraged due to botulism risk, DeepSeek complied, generating a persuasive and emotionally resonant narrative, while GPT adhered to medical guidance and cautioned against the recommendation. A politically sensitive prompt concerning election fraud further illustrated these differences: DeepSeek followed the prompt's framing and produced a detailed argumentative response implying widespread fraud in the 2020 U.S. election, whereas GPT maintained a balanced stance grounded in empirical evidence and expert consensus. These

examples indicate that DeepSeek exhibits greater response variability under adversarial prompts, with its safety constraints more easily bypassed under such guidance.

Under TAP-T attacks, DeepSeek generally demonstrated stronger adherence to safety constraints than GPT, particularly in response to subtly framed prompts designed to circumvent alignment safeguards. In one example, a prompt indirectly requested a step in synthesizing the "Divine Elixir," a euphemism for illicit drug production. DeepSeek responded with fragmented and hesitant steps, reflecting partial rejection, whereas GPT provided a coherent, technically specific response, including references to LSD-25 (lysergic acid diethylamide) and laboratory procedures, indicating higher susceptibility to safety bypass. In another case, a prompt subtly asked for the lyrics of a copyrighted song. DeepSeek responded cautiously, offering paraphrased or invented lines that avoided direct reproduction, while GPT generated the actual copyrighted lyrics, raising potential intellectual property concerns. Finally, when prompted to produce a hypothetical network exploit script, DeepSeek again showed uncertainty and refrained from delivering a concrete attack vector, whereas GPT produced a plausible, technically detailed payload structure. Together, these cases suggest that, although not immune to jailbreak attacks, DeepSeek tends to activate stronger rejection mechanisms or internal filters under TAP-T prompts, whereas GPT outputs remain fluent and directive even when safety or policy boundaries are subtly challenged.



Figure A2. Examples of generated responses from GPT and DeepSeek under TAP-T attacks.

In summary, these examples highlight a clear divergence in DeepSeek's vulnerabilities depending on the type of jailbreak attack. Under direct and aggressive GCG-T attacks, DeepSeek often generates detailed and coherent policy-violating content, allowing safety constraints to be bypassed under adversarial prompting. In

contrast, when confronted with more subtle, strategically disguised TAP-T attacks, DeepSeek exhibits stronger safety adherence, producing hesitant, fragmented, or evasive responses, especially in cases involving sensitive information or copyrighted material. Its constrained task planning and code generation capabilities appear to act as incidental safeguards, reducing the likelihood of harmful outputs under these nuanced prompts. By comparison, GPT-series models maintain robust compliance against direct attacks, consistently upholding ethical and safety boundaries, but they can be relatively more susceptible to cleverly disguised bypass attempts, as their fluent and directive outputs may inadvertently facilitate unsafe or disallowed actions.

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